Delaying the Buck: Timing and Strategic Advantages in Executive-Legislative Bargaining over Appropriations

Anderson, Sarah; Woon, Jonathan

doi:10.1080/07343469.2013.852273

Cited by 6 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 17 publications

(3 reference statements)

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“…Improving upon Kriner and Reeves’ already solid research design, I make several adjustments. First, following others (Alexander et al 2016; Anderson and Woon 2014; Fouirnaies and Mutlu-Eren 2015), I account for the delay between the appropriation and allocation of federal outlays. Because federal expenditures in a given year are based upon the appropriations budget passed 1 year earlier, I match federal grants spent in year t to the political and demographic characteristics of year t−1 .…”

Section: Evidence Of Core-state Targetingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Particularism or Policy? When Distributive Outlays Flow to the President’s Core Supporters

2022

Political Research Quarterly

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The literature on distributive politics reveals that presidents regularly influence federal spending and disproportionately direct federal grants toward their core supporters. This paper offers a comprehensive assessment of the interpretation of core-supporter targeting. Empirical evidence shows that the underlying patterns of partisan targeting do not accord with standard accounts of party-building activities nor electoral considerations that are evidence of presidential particularism. Instead, this paper argues that presidential policy priority better explains core-state targeting. Presidents use agencies that are ideologically aligned with them or associated with their policy priorities to enhance the largesse they bestow on core constituencies, and this is the consequence of presidents pursuing ideological and policy goals. Collectively, it indicates a less cynical point of view on the orientation of the American presidency.

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Section: Evidence Of Core-state Targetingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Particularism or Policy? When Distributive Outlays Flow to the President’s Core Supporters

2022

Political Research Quarterly

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“…It is also possible, however, that control over the legislative branch is not what really matters, as the executive branch is also deeply involved in the budget process [33,34]: the governor submits an executive budget proposal to the legislature and also holds considerable veto power of the final proposal in many states. It is therefore possible that voters hold the governor accountable when the budget adoption process is gridlocked.…”

Section: Gridlock and Electoral Accountability: Three Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Irresponsible parties, responsible voters? Legislative gridlock and collective accountability

2020

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Legislative gridlock is a failure of one of the key functions of government: to pass legislation. Can voters counter such political dysfunction? This paper examines whether and how voters hold politicians accountable for gridlock. We focus on the passage of the government budget, the central task of any legislature, and define a legislature to experience budgetary gridlock if it fails to pass the budget on time. We argue, based on evidence from twenty years of budget enactment data, that voters hold state legislators accountable for budget gridlock in US state governments, with gridlocked incumbents losing their seat more often than incumbents passing budgets on time. Based on established theories of party organization in American politics, we develop three competing theoretical hypotheses to guide our understanding of the observed patterns of retrospective voting. We find strong support for collective electoral accountability with voters punishing incumbent members of state legislature majority parties.

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“…Namely, presidential popularity (Canes-Wrone & de Marchi, 2002) and coalition building capacity (Weatherford, 1993;Peake, 2002) have been related to legislative success of his agenda. To that effect, Anderson and Woon (2014) find the bargaining process for appropriations bill is heavily affected by the president's position and his ability to negotiate with Congress. Legislators are more likely to support the president when he is popular, as they can tie their electoral fates to him and use his support later to push their own agenda.…”

Section: Fiscal Gridlockmentioning

confidence: 99%

Paygo for punctuality

Fowler

2016

Journal of Public Budgeting, Accounting &Amp; Financial Management

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The federal budgeting process is wrought with conflict that makes it nearly impossible for the budget to be passed on time, or so it seems. One aspect overlooked is the effects of statutory Pay-As-You-Go (PAYGO) rules. The cursory evidence indicates PAYGO may be beneficial under certain circumstances. The analysis relies on an Autoregressive-Moving-Average (ARMA) time series model with data from appropriations bills signed into law from fiscal years 1994 to 2014. The findings indicate mixed effects for PAYGO statutes with a shorter budgeting timeline under the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, but a longer timeline under the Statutory PAYGO Act of 2010. Additional findings suggest substantive relationships between the length of the budgeting process and party polarization, presidential leadership, and the economy.

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Delaying the Buck: Timing and Strategic Advantages in Executive-Legislative Bargaining over Appropriations

Cited by 6 publications

References 17 publications

Particularism or Policy? When Distributive Outlays Flow to the President’s Core Supporters

Particularism or Policy? When Distributive Outlays Flow to the President’s Core Supporters

Irresponsible parties, responsible voters? Legislative gridlock and collective accountability

Paygo for punctuality

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