Déjà vu diplomacy: South Korea's Middle East policy under Lee Myung-bak

Abstract

This paper probes major directions in South Korea's Middle East foreign policy under the presidency of Lee Myung-bak, during a turbulent transitional period in the region. These include serious attempts to forge multifaceted and long-lasting connections with members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), efforts to penetrate Kurdistan's energy and construction industries, and strategies to overcome the quandary of sanctions against Iran. Epitomized by the concept of 'déjà vu diplomacy', this study argues that Lee drew heavily on his previous experiences in the Middle East in a nostalgic sense of thrill and action, striving to foster Seoul's policy goals and to extend the country's increasing vested interests in the region. Drawing on international relations theory, this research also attributes the Lee administration's achievements in the Middle East to a combination of both individual (statesman) and international system (structure) elements, with a greater emphasis on the former than on the latter. However, it in no way gainsays the overall contribution of the state bureaucracy as an ancillary component to other parameters.

South Korea'S Middle East Policy: Uae'S Case

“…It is characterized by the gradual intensification of interstate cooperation on oil supplies, labor migration and the promotion of South Korea's business interests in the UAE (construction business, export of household appliances, etc.). At this time, Seoul had not considered the Middle East in the long term and, consequently, there was practically no regional policy with this regards, and decisions were made on a case-by-case basis in the bureaucratic offices of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Azad, 2013…”

“…This enabled to significantly expand and deepen the established interests of Seoul in the region. One of the key features in the relationship between ROK and the UAE during the Lee Myung-bak era was close interaction with the UAE royal family and an unprecedented number of high-level official visits (39 reciprocal visits at the level of state heads and ministers), which launched similar processes in the business circles of both countries and contributed to the atmosphere of trust (Azad, 2013;Jeong, 2019). The development of tools for vertical and horizontal diplomacy allowed Seoul to make a breakthrough in the Middle East.…”

“…This meant the transition of bilateral relations https://doi. org/10.15405/epsbs.2021.05.350 Corresponding Author: Gulnara Nilovna Valiakhmetova Selection and peer-review under responsibility of the Organizing Committee of the conference eISSN: 2357-1330 2627 to the level of strategic partnership (Azad, 2013). To further consolidate efforts with ROK in the economic field, in May 2010 Abu Dhabi established the UAE Korean Business Council.…”

Tethered to Sanctions to the Nth Degree: The Rise and Fall of South Korea in Iran

“…After hesitating and engaging in behind-the-scene diplomacy for some time, the conservative government of Lee Myung-bak (February 2008–February 2013) eventually toed the line by agreeing to shut down the Seoul branch of Bank Mellat in September 2010 and blacklisting or sanctioning some 201 Iranian entities and individuals for their alleged active role in the controversial nuclear program. As a Middle East-savvy Korean politician with many years of professional experience in the region, Lee Myung-bak did his utmost to maintain the ROK’s lucrative commercial interactions with Iran by persuading the Obama administration to accept a won-based escrow account for the Iranian central bank opened by the state-run Woori Bank and Industrial Bank of Korea (IBK) in 2010 (Azad, 2013). For nearly a decade, this settlement system was used for clearing up payments by Korean importers of Iranian crude oil and Iranian importers of Korean products.…”

Principlism Engages Pragmatism: Iran's Relations With East Asia Under Ahmadinejad

“…Moreover, neither of the two Koreas expected Tehran to fundamentally favor it at the cost of the other party, nor has Iran really attempted to take advantage of its special relationship with the Korean peninsula and blackmail one Korea in order to get some benefit from the other. Even the conservative government of Lee Myung‐bak (2008–2013) with its close attachment to the Americans, did not raise any objection to Tehran's ties to Pyongyang at a time of global obsession with the Iranian nuclear program and all the huff and puff about Iran's subterranean links to the reclusive DPRK regime (Azad, ).…”