Degree of monopoly and class struggle: political aspects of Kalecki's pricing and distribution theory

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to analyse the concept of class struggle in Michal Kalecki's writings. First, his inclusion of trade unions' strength as one of the determining elements of the degree of monopoly is examined, taking into consideration Abba Lerner's formulation of the latter and its development by Kalecki. Then, the limits of this understanding of class struggle are pointed out from the standpoint of Karl Marx's conceptual distinction between labor and labor-power. Finally, a reinterpretation of Kalecki's 'Political aspects of full employment' is provided, indicating the broader conception of class struggle implicit in this work and its usefulness to a better understanding of capital-labor conflicts in contemporary capitalism.

The Long Expansion and the Profit Squeeze: Output and Profit Cycles in Brazil (1996–2016)

“…The bet on the division of the ruling classes failed, according to Singer (2020), who identifies a reunification of the bourgeoisie from 2012 onward. See also Rugitsky (2015). 27 Given that part of the policies consisted of a decrease in payroll taxes, its impact would only be felt on the after-tax profit rate, instead of on the gross (before taxes) profit rate used in the present research.…”

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