Defusing the social minefield of gold sites in Kamituga, South Kivu. From legal pluralism to the re-making of institutions?

Abstract

DRC's 2002 Mining Code has attracted Large-Scale Mining (LSM) through favorable fiscal conditions, but is detrimental to Artisanal and Small-scale Mining (ASM). The Code specifies that ASM should take place in Artisanal Exploitation Zones (AEZ), but far too few AEZ were created to accommodate the large number of artisanal miners. This has triggered an explosive situation, as many artisanal miners operate in mining concessions granted to LSM companies. While LSM companies justify their operations referring to statutory law, miners claim traditional rights to the land. We study how this situation of legal pluralism plays out in Kamituga, a gold mining area in South-Kivu. To what extent do the artisanal miners and the LSM company stick to their opposing frames of reference? To what extent do they look for compromises? Can these compromises give way to the re-making of institutions? 1 The research was funded by FWO -Research Foundation Flanders (grant numbers 1517614N & 11Q2816N), and by CEGEMI -Centre d'Expertise en Gestion Minière. Permission to conduct the research was granted by the University of Antwerp's Ethics Committee for the Social Sciences and Humanities (file nr. SHW_15_06), by the Congolese Ministry of Mines, by SAESSCAM (the Congolese public Service for Assistance to Artisanal andSmall-Scale mining) and by the local authorities in Kamituga. This research would not have been possible without the artisanal miners of Kamituga who offered their time to be interviewed, or without the enumerators who worked in sometimes challenging circumstances. We offer them our sincere gratitude. We further owe thanks to employees of Banro, SAESSCAM, and IPIS and INSO for their assistance and for sharing valuable information and data with us. Finally, we thank

How much do artisanal miners earn? An inquiry among Congolese gold miners

“…machines, water pumps, or any other tools that lift productivity above the 'artisanal' level (Kilosho Buraye et al, 2017;Mulonda et al, 2019).…”

Would You Fight? We Asked Aggrieved Artisanal Miners in Eastern Congo

“…“Local content” policies that increase the number of local employees may also assuage grievances, as well as reduce the opportunity cost to fight. Both these micro-motivations are also addressed when companies tolerate miners in some parts of their concession, or set up programs to relocate or reorient artisanal miners (Kilosho Buraye, Stoop, and Verpoorten 2017). The effectiveness of the corporate initiatives depends however to a large extent on the capacity and trustworthiness of the local institutions that are relied upon for the implementation (Geenen 2019).…”

“…Certain areas were off limits, and miners were not allowed to open new pits, or make use of dynamite, crushing mills and electricity—all of which enhance the productivity of artisanal mining. To enforce these rules, Banro mainly relied on the Mining Police and at times on the Congolese national army; but artisanal miners continued to bend the rules, at times with the complicity of the same security forces (Kilosho Buraye, Stoop, and Verpoorten 2017). In an attempt to maintain good relations with the population and artisanal miners in its concession, Banro invested in public goods and services, such as roads, hospitals and schools (Banro 2014b), and looked to employ Congolese individuals, preferably from the local mining communities.…”

“…In an attempt to maintain good relations with the population and artisanal miners in its concession, Banro invested in public goods and services, such as roads, hospitals and schools (Banro 2014b), and looked to employ Congolese individuals, preferably from the local mining communities. The company also sought to collaborate with the Congolese Ministry of Mines and its public Service for Assistance to Artisanal and Small-Scale mining (SAESSCAM) to facilitate the creation of an officially registered Artisanal Exploitation Zone within their concession, where ASM would be tolerated even during Banro’s production phase (Kilosho Buraye, Stoop, and Verpoorten 2017). Furthermore, Banro set up a partnership with USAID intended to roll out relocation and reorientation projects for artisanal miners (Banro 2014b).…”

“…While Banro hoped that these initiatives would give them a “social licence to operate,” there were several challenges to overcome. As such, the training and employment programs—often managed through subcontracting with local elites—were temporary, low-skilled, low-paid, plagued by corruption, and could only reach a small share of artisanal miners, thus oftentimes increasing rather than decreasing grievances (Geenen and Claessens 2013; Kilosho Buraye, Stoop, and Verpoorten 2017; Verweijen 2017).…”