Definition and Overview of Emerging Threats

Lindler, Luther E.; Choffnes, E. R.; Korch, George W.

doi:10.1385/1-59259-764-5:351

Cited by 2 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 21 publications

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“…The second, and very critical, role for genomic analysis of NIS organisms is in the determination of whether the NIS was genetically altered. Lindler et al [42] notes that the genotyping of pathogens would aid infectious disease specialists and Human Intelligence agencies (HUMINT) in the identification of BW agents as well as genetically engineered BW agents [42]. If an NIS invasion was found with the NIS genetically engineered, especially for enhanced invasion traits or novel weapons, then this evidence would be highly indicative that the NIS introduction was not accidental, but a deliberate NIS BW attack.…”

Section: Nis Genomic Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%

Analysis of Introduced Species as a form of Biological Weapon: part 2- Strategies for Discernment of an Attack and Countermeasures

F¹

2013

Biosafety

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One key issue with biological weapons (BW) using Non-Indigenous Species (NIS) (aka invasive species) is to differentiate a deliberate attack from a natural outbreak or accidental introduction via commerce or other means. The methods to detect a Non-Indigenous Species based Biological Warfare (NIS BW) attack as well as discern accidental introductions from a deliberate attack are diverse and challenging. They include a multi-tiered analysis to rule out the following: possible routes of accidental releases from commercial trade; escapes from exotic breeders; releases of exotic pets; and release or dispersal of NIS from catastrophic storms, prevailing wind currents or animal migrations. Other keys to determine a deliberate NIS BW attack are detection of uncommon routes of entry; widespread dissemination of the NIS; extremely high rates of propagules found; or evidence of genetic alternation of NIS, especially to enhance invasiveness, reproduction, or colonization traits as well as human intelligence of a planned BW attack using the introduced organism; and evidence of culturing of the NIS organism by a nation state or terrorist facility. In all cases of NIS BW, it is a violation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) as the NIS is considered a biological agent used for hostile purposes. This paper also briefly explores other international treaties that would prohibit use of NIS BW. The recommendations for countermeasures (either as prevention or as remediation) to a NIS BW attack include the following tasks; expansion of NIS databases, improvements to the APHIS Port Information Network (PIN) data collection and database availability, and enhancements to NIS research in experimental controlled field trials. Another important counterstrategy is to expand research on potential NIS organisms including enhancements to Environmental Niche Modeling software. The enhancements on the software and data processing accuracy would improve the predictive potential of these tools. Next, although NIS genomic mapping is still in its infancy, expansion of genomic maps of NIS organisms would serve several purposes. First, it would expand understanding of the role that genetic variability plays in invasion survival and colonization in naïve niches as well as locate specific genes necessary for successful invasion and colonization. Also, genomic maps would accelerate the development of gene-based diagnostics for NIS BW detection. Second, NIS genomic maps would help in the detection of genetically engineered NIS organisms. The detection of genetically altered NIS would strongly indicate that a NIS BW attack had occurred. Furthermore, regardless of whether the identity of the originator of the NIS BW attack was known or not, the revelation of a NIS BW attack with genetically engineered traits must be reported to the BTWC committee for follow up investigation. Biosafety B io safet y

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Section: Nis Genomic Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%

Analysis of Introduced Species as a form of Biological Weapon: part 2- Strategies for Discernment of an Attack and Countermeasures

F¹

2013

Biosafety

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“…Subsequent investigations have demonstrated that EBOV-infected pigs have the potential to transmit virus under laboratory conditions in an interspecies (nonhuman primates) and intraspecies manner through airborne and contact transmission, respectively (Kobinger et al, 2011;Weingartl et al, 2012). It has been argued that the increasing advances in our understanding of these pathogens, and the disease processes they mediate, may provoke the development of engineered pathogens with enhanced virulence (Petro et al, 2003;Lindler et al, 2005).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Systems kinomics for characterizing host responses to high-consequence pathogens at the NIH/NIAID Integrated Research Facility-Frederick

et al. 2014

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Currently, there is a paucity of information regarding the molecular pathogenesis for many high-consequence pathogens (HCPs) that pose threats to both national and international public health. In spite of this, investigations of the molecular pathogenesis for many HCPs have been limited to gross pathological changes in animal models or global analysis of gene expression. Further, questions remain regarding the ability of animal models of disease to recapitulate human molecular pathogenesis or act as predictors of therapeutic efficacy. Thus, it is likely that medical countermeasure development for HCPs will rely on identifying therapeutic targets that are uniquely modulated during HCP infection. It is also appreciated that many cellular processes can be regulated independently of changes in transcription or translation through phosphorylation events. Cellular kinases, individually or collectively (the kinome), play critical roles in regulating complex biology, underlie various malignancies, and represent high-priority drug targets. The growing interest in kinases in both basic and translational research has driven efforts to develop technologies that enable characterization of phosphorylation-mediated signal transduction. To this end, enhanced technical capabilities at the IRF-Frederick provide the unique capability for characterizing host responses to HCP insult during the course of infection and identify novel targets for therapeutic intervention.

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Definition and Overview of Emerging Threats

Cited by 2 publications

References 21 publications

Analysis of Introduced Species as a form of Biological Weapon: part 2- Strategies for Discernment of an Attack and Countermeasures

Analysis of Introduced Species as a form of Biological Weapon: part 2- Strategies for Discernment of an Attack and Countermeasures

Systems kinomics for characterizing host responses to high-consequence pathogens at the NIH/NIAID Integrated Research Facility-Frederick

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