Deference Done Better

Dorst, Kevin; Levinstein, Benjamin A.; Salow, Bernhard; Husic, Brooke E.; Fitelson, Branden

doi:10.1111/phpe.12156

Philosophical Perspectives

2021

DOI: 10.1111/phpe.12156

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Deference Done Better

Kevin Dorst

Benjamin A. Levinstein

Bernhard Salow

et al.

Abstract: equally-they jointly proved the theorems and wrote the paper.† B.E.H. and B.F. pioneered the computational methods and located the key counterexample (Fact 2.1); together, these made the rest of the paper possible.

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Cited by 11 publications

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References 78 publications

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“… 3 For alternative chance deference principles, see Hall (1994), Ismael (2008), Levinstein (Forthcoming), and Dorst et al (2021), for instance. …”

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confidence: 99%

Indifference to Anti-Humean Chances

Gallow

2022

Can. J. of Philosophy

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An indifference principle says that your credences should be distributed uniformly over each of the possibilities you recognise. A chance deference principle says that your credences should be aligned with the chances. My thesis is that if we are anti-Humeans about chance, then these two principles are incompatible. Anti-Humeans think that it is possible for the actual frequencies to depart from the chances. As long as you recognise possibilities like this, you cannot both spread your credences evenly and defer to the chances. I discuss some weaker forms of indifference which will allow anti-Humeans to defer to the chances.

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“… 3 For alternative chance deference principles, see Hall (1994), Ismael (2008), Levinstein (Forthcoming), and Dorst et al (2021), for instance. …”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Indifference to Anti-Humean Chances

Gallow

2022

Can. J. of Philosophy

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Local and global deference

Gallow

2023

Philos Stud

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A norm of local expert deference says that your credence in an arbitrary proposition A, given that the expert’s probability for A is n, should be n. A norm of global expert deference says that your credence in A, given that the expert’s entire probability function is E, should be E(A). Gaifman taught us that these two norms are not equivalent. Stalnaker conjectures that Gaifman’s example is “a loophole”. Here, I substantiate Stalnaker’s suspicions by providing characterisation theorems which tell us precisely when the two norms come apart. They tell us that, in a good sense, Gaifman’s example is the only case where the two norms differ. I suggest that the lesson of the theorems is that Bayesian epistemologists need not concern themselves with the differences between these two kinds of norms. While they are not strictly speaking equivalent, they are equivalent for all philosophical purposes.

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Superconditioning

Huttegger

2024

Philos Stud

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When can a shift from a prior to a posterior be represented by conditionalization? A well-known result, known as “superconditioning” and going back to work by Diaconis and Zabell, gives a sharp answer. This paper extends the result and connects it to the reflection principle and common priors. I show that a shift from a prior to a set of posteriors can be represented within a conditioning model if and only if the prior and the posteriors are connected via a general form of the reflection principle. Common priors can be characterized by principles that require a certain kind of coherence between distinct sets of posteriors. I discuss the implications these results have for diachronic and synchronic modes of updating, learning experiences, the common prior assumption of game theory, and time-slice epistemology.

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Deference Done Better

Abstract: equally-they jointly proved the theorems and wrote the paper.† B.E.H. and B.F. pioneered the computational methods and located the key counterexample (Fact 2.1); together, these made the rest of the paper possible.

Cited by 11 publications

References 78 publications

Indifference to Anti-Humean Chances

Indifference to Anti-Humean Chances

Local and global deference

Superconditioning

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