1987
DOI: 10.1177/002070208704200401
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Defending the Indefensible: Some Historical Perspectives on Canadian Defence 1867–1987

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“…34 As the proposed acquisition of submarines suggests, a central consideration in the shaping of Canadian postwar defence policy has been that 'the Soviet Union was the ultimate threat but the United States was the immediate danger'. 55 If Canada did not play its part in continental (and Alliance) defence, the danger was that the United States' role would be enhanced at the cost of Canadian sovereignty. The 1987 White Paper emerged after years of American complaints about Canada's low level of spending on defence and a period of disappointment that the Conservative rhetoric had not resulted in higher expenditure after the electoral victory of 1984.…”
Section: Canadian and Australian Defence Policies In An Era Of Detentementioning
confidence: 99%
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“…34 As the proposed acquisition of submarines suggests, a central consideration in the shaping of Canadian postwar defence policy has been that 'the Soviet Union was the ultimate threat but the United States was the immediate danger'. 55 If Canada did not play its part in continental (and Alliance) defence, the danger was that the United States' role would be enhanced at the cost of Canadian sovereignty. The 1987 White Paper emerged after years of American complaints about Canada's low level of spending on defence and a period of disappointment that the Conservative rhetoric had not resulted in higher expenditure after the electoral victory of 1984.…”
Section: Canadian and Australian Defence Policies In An Era Of Detentementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Besides the modernization of the four existing Tribal class destroyers (which had been underway since 1985), this included the purchase of a second batch of six frigates equipped with new anti-submarine helicopters (which would bring the destroyer/frigate strength to fourteen, still below Canada's commitment to the NATO fleet), the acquisition of a fleet of twelve vessels for coastal defence and minesweeping, which, in a revolutionary new move, were to be manned by the naval reserve, and greater emphasis on underwater surveillance. In its most controversial proposal the government planned to invest in a fleet of 10-12 nuclear-powered submarines which it saw as 'uniquely capable antisubmarine platforms' and the only proven vehicle 'capable of sustained operation under the ice' [49][50][51][52][53][54][55] covering Canada's northern waters.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…National defence has preoccupied Canadian political leaders only episodically, in moments of sudden international crises; never was (modern) Canada forced to struggle for its own physical survival. 10 To these elements underlying Canadian pragmatism abroad Á that is, an inclination towards a prudent and adaptable approach to international security Á is commonly associated an endorsement of a set of interests conditioned by 'cosmopolitan values'. These are said to explain Canada's active involvement in the peaceful management of international conflicts, a trend that has alternatively been described as a 'multilateralist tradition', 11 'pragmatic idealism', 12 'cooperative security' 13 and even 'postmodernism'.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%