Defending Stability under Threat: Sensitive Periods and the Repression of Protest in Urban China

Abstract

How does the elevated threat of protests during sensitive periods affect state repression in a high-capacity authoritarian regime? Drawing on a dataset of over 3,100 protests in three Chinese megacities, this study provides three key findings: first, the frequency of protests before and during national-level focal events and subsequent to national-level disruptive events is depressed, suggesting preemptive repression is taking place. Second, the likelihood of responsive repression is marginally reduced before and during local-level focal events and slightly elevated after national-level disruptive events. Third, contention is intensified when local political elites meet. Sensitive periods do not bring contention to a standstill and costly bursts of responsive repression were not observed. Stability maintenance during times of increased regime-vulnerability was thus less rigid than often assumed. On 2 June, 2014, urban management officers in Shanghai's Pudong District forcefully removed an elderly woman's street vendor stall. They then manhandled two students who recorded the scene on camera. Quickly, a crowd of over 1,000 people gathered and blocked the officers and arriving police from leaving. An hour-long standoff ensued until a large police reinforcement managed to disperse the crowd. No major clashes or arrests were reported. 1 Two days later, on 4 June, a group of 46 petitioners took the metro from a suburb to the city center. They first traveled to the Shanghai Higher People's Court, where a security guard received their petition in support of their longstanding attempt to file an administrative litigation case against the city government. 2 After taking a group picture with a protest banner in front of the court, the petitioners had lunch and continued to the Shanghai People's Congress, where they delivered their complaint letter to a member of staff. No police presence or arrests were reported during their contentious city tour. 3 Although different in many ways, both 'contentious gatherings' 4 were triggered by alleged state misconduct and proceeded without massive repression, or even any coercion at all. This is remarkable because they occurred on or shortly before 4 June, the annual anniversary of the violent suppression of the Beijing student movement of 1989. The period preceding this anniversary undoubtedly is among the most 'sensitive periods' (敏感时期) on the Chinese political calendar, when the security apparatus is on high alert. The two episodes suggest that this does not necessarily lead to a total standstill of protests, or that those who do mobilize must expect punitive repression. While selective toleration is

Demobilizing Veterans: Campaign-Style Stability Maintenance in China

“…First, the state embraces campaign-style approaches during what are referred to as “sensitive periods” 敏感时期. As H. Christoph Steinhardt (2021: 527) articulated, such periods are “the time prior to an event (that is known in advance) or subsequent to an event (that is not known in advance), where the event itself can serve as a coordination mechanism for contentious mobilization.…”

Stability justice: Petitioners versus non-petitioners in China's criminal adjudication

“…Although the law is selectively employed, law enforcement organs are actually turning against the formal law to enforce the will of the autocratic rulers (Levitsky & Way, 2010; see also, Davenport, 2014; Earl, 2011; LaPorte, 2017; Oliver, 2008; Shen‐Bayh, 2018). Truex's (2019) research on preemptive detention, for example, showed that political dissidents in China were more likely to be detained shortly before or during politically sensitive periods and were released shortly after the end of those periods (see also Steinhardt, 2021). Although all decisions on detention and release are supposed to be made with reference to the law, such a “catch‐and‐release” dynamic indicates a hollow implementation of legal procedures and an overt disregard for the law.…”

“…Compared to routine practice in ordinary times, the authorities have a heavier burden of maintaining social stability during politically sensitive periods—that is, periods when significant social or political events are taking place. As these periods draw close, the authorities are more inclined to hold petitioners in custody through pre‐trial detention (Steinhardt, 2021; Truex, 2019). We thus expect:Hypothesis Petitioner defendants are more likely than non‐petitioner defendants to be detained before a politically sensitive period.…”

“…2 For example, the infamous re-education through labor system, which was a frequently used mechanism to detain "citizen trouble-makers," was abolished in December 2013, and all the detainees were immediately released. 3 Although some empirical evidence indicates the continued existence of extralegal repression strategies at grassroots level (Fu & Distelhorst, 2017;Steinhardt, 2021;Truex, 2019), the regime has become more cautious over the use of violence in its governance (Tsai, 2021).…”