Defending “Liberal Democracy”? Why Older South Koreans Took to the Streets Against the 2016-17 Candlelight Protests*

Yang, Myungji

doi:10.17813/1086-671x-25-3-365

Cited by 9 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…December 23, accessed https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oQMk8myni3Y. 31 Han G.-H. 2017. talks (see Yang 2020). They were concerned, therefore, about the summits between Kim Jong-Un of North Korea and Donald Trump of the United States in 2018 and 2019.…”

Section: Nostalgia Belief In Fake News and Irrationalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Calculated Nationalism in Contemporary South Korea

Han¹

2023

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Section: Nostalgia Belief In Fake News and Irrationalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Calculated Nationalism in Contemporary South Korea

Han¹

2023

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“…Despite the lack of organizational resources, the movement was compensated with participants’ exceptionally high morale. Yang (2020) shows that the rally participants share a strong anti-communism, and the shared ideology became the driving force behind the mobilization. I conducted in-depth interviews with 25 rally participants over the age of 60 26 .…”

Section: The Candlelight Movement and The Taegeukgi Rallies In South ...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Authoritarian Successor Parties, Supporters, and Protest: Lessons from Asian Democracies

Lee

2023

J. East Asian Stud.

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Are authoritarian successor party (ASP) supporters more likely to protest? I propose that ASP supporters are less likely to protest in general. The post-democratization mobilization environment is shaped upon the pre-democratization mobilization basis. During the pre-democratization period, protest was organized around the democracy movement. Thus, protest tactics and networks were accumulated through it. As former authoritarian ruling party supporters, ASP supporters are less likely to have legacies of participating in the democracy movement, which prevents them from accessing the accumulated protest resources from the democracy movement. However, I argue that this negative association varies based on the ASP qualities and supporters’ age. Supporters of ASPs that maintain strong pre-democratization legacies are more likely to participate in protests than supporters of ASPs that do not strongly highlight their authoritarian legacies. Also, when the ASPs’ characteristics are considered, older ASP supporters are more likely to participate in protests than younger supporters. Using both single-level and multilevel statistical analyses, I examine four Asian countries with politically powerful ASPs and find evidence supporting my hypotheses. Lastly, I compare two South Korean mass movements, the Candlelight movement and the Taegeukgi rallies to unpack the relationships between ASP supporters, protest resources, and mobilization. This study reveals authoritarian legacies among post-democratization citizens through ASP supporters’ protesting behavior.

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“…28 Other accounts underline the mobilizing role of conservative elites, as right-wing intellectuals craft historical narratives and mold a collective identity for Korea's illiberal camp. 29 In Japan, the conservative shift at the national level under Abe Shinzo (2012-20) and the rise of extreme parties like the Ishin no kai in Osaka are seen as the institutional environment that activated the Far Right. 30 These analyses inform how people's grievances and emotions meet with political elites' organizational and discursive resources to generate Far Right mobilization.…”

Section: Explaining the Rise Of The Far Right: Same Causes In East Asia?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Cold War Undercurrents: The Extreme-Right Variants in East Asia

Lee

2021

Politics & Society

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This study examines the mobilization of the Far Right in Korea and Japan in the 2000s and probes how and why the actors and political claims of East Asian extremists differ from their counterparts in Europe and North America. The Far Right forces in Korea and Japan are politically regressive in glorifying the authoritarian or colonial past and cling to unchanging ideological claims from the postwar decades in their current targeting of old-time, internal “others.” This divergence is explained by the United States–led Cold War geopolitics in Asia, under which Far Right elites were fortified in postwar Japan and Korea. The Cold War that has not ended in Asia as opposed to Europe or North America further allows the institutional sustainability of the radical Right and the political resonance of its old ideology of anticommunism and colonial racism. As such, democratic politics in East Asia is predicated on Cold War undercurrents.

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Defending “Liberal Democracy”? Why Older South Koreans Took to the Streets Against the 2016-17 Candlelight Protests*

Cited by 9 publications

References 0 publications

Calculated Nationalism in Contemporary South Korea

Calculated Nationalism in Contemporary South Korea

Authoritarian Successor Parties, Supporters, and Protest: Lessons from Asian Democracies

Cold War Undercurrents: The Extreme-Right Variants in East Asia

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