Defeating the self-defeat argument for phenomenal conservativism

DePoe, John M.

doi:10.1007/s11098-009-9482-7

Cited by 19 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 6 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…However, the way "acquaintance" is typically used in contemporary debates-as a relation whose extension includes various kinds of indirect causal or informational links with a thing (see, e.g., Jeshion, 2010, p. 109)-is not of a piece with the stricter "direct awareness" notion of acquaintance introduced above, which is the notion used by contemporary philosophers discussing self-knowledge or perception. 9 Contemporary acquaintance theorists-i.e., those who appeal to the philosophical notion of acquaintance in a substantial and positive way-include Balog (2012Balog ( , 2019, Bigelow and Pargetter (1990), BonJour (2001, 2003a, Brewer (2004Brewer ( , 2011Brewer ( , 2019, Campbell (2002Campbell ( , 2009, Chalmers (1996Chalmers ( , 2003Chalmers ( , 2007Chalmers ( , 2010, Coleman (2019), DePoe (2011, Dickie (2010), Dickinson (2019), Duncan (2015Duncan ( , 2017Duncan ( , 2018aDuncan ( , 2018bDuncan ( , 2020, Fales (1996), Fish (2009), Fumerton (1995Fumerton ( , 2001Fumerton ( , 2005Fumerton ( , 2019, Gertler (2001Gertler ( , 2011Gertler ( , 2012, Giustina (forthcoming), Goff (2015), Graham and Horgan (2000), Hasan (2011Hasan ( , 2013aHasan ( , 2013b, Hellie (2007Hellie ( , 2010, Howell (2013)…”

Section: Endnotesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Contemporary acquaintance theorists—i.e., those who appeal to the philosophical notion of acquaintance in a substantial and positive way—include Balog (2012, 2019), Bigelow and Pargetter (1990, 2006), BonJour (2001, 2003a), Brewer (2004, 2011, 2019), Campbell (2002, 2009), Chalmers (1996, 2003, 2007, 2010), Coleman (2019), DePoe (2011, 2012, 2018), Dickie (2010), Dickinson (2019), Duncan (2015, 2017, 2018a, 2018b, 2020, forthcoming), Fales (1996), Fish (2009), Fumerton (1995, 2001, 2005, 2019), Gertler (2001, 2011, 2012), Giustina (forthcoming), Goff (2015), Graham and Horgan (2000), Hasan (2011, 2013a, 2013b), Hellie (2007, 2010), Howell (2013), Levine (2006, 2008, 2010, 2019a, 2019b), Lund (1994, 2005, 2014), McDowell (1986), McGinn (1996, 2008), McGrew (1995, 1999), Moser (1989, 2009), Nida‐Rümelin (1995, 1998, 2007), Pautz (2007, 2017), Pitt (2004, …”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Acquaintance

Duncan

2021

Philosophy Compass

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

To be acquainted with something (in the philosophical sense of "acquainted" discussed here) is to be directly aware of it. The idea that we are acquainted with certain things we experience has been discussed throughout the history of Western Philosophy, but in the early 20th century it gained especially focused attention among analytic philosophers who drew their inspiration from Bertrand Russell's work on acquaintance. Since then, many philosophers-particularly those working on self-knowledge or perception-have used the notion of acquaintance to explain various facts about human experience and knowledge. In this paper, I offer an overview of this work, with particular focus on the resurgent literature on acquaintance in contemporary analytic philosophy. After more fully explaining what acquaintance is (or is supposed to be), I describe some reasons for thinking that we are indeed acquainted with certain things we experience, and then I survey some of the facts about experience and knowledge that acquaintance may help explain. 1 | INTRODUCTION This paper is about acquaintance-an especially direct mental relation that we (allegedly) bear to certain things we experience, such as colors, smells, tastes, pains, and itches. This philosophical notion has received renewed interest and use of late, but it has also invited misunderstanding and skepticism. My aim in this paper is to dispel some of that misunderstanding and, hopefully, some of the skepticism too. Most contemporary philosophers who appeal to acquaintance draw their inspiration from Bertrand Russell (1911, 1912), who characterizes acquaintance as direct awareness. This differs from the ordinary sense of "acquaintance," as in "Hector and Paula are acquaintances" (or related knowledge attributions, such as "Hector knows Paula"). For one may be acquainted with something in that sense without being directly aware of it.

show abstract

Section: Endnotesmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Acquaintance

Duncan

2021

Philosophy Compass

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Instinct and intuition are, however, problematic guides (DePoe, ; Greenhalgh, ). For example, while you might instinctively intuit that neoliberalism is a mostly good thing, and I might not—what then?…”

Section: Rebuttals and Closurementioning

confidence: 99%

Neoliberalism and neoliberals: What are we talking about?

Lipscomb

2019

Nursing Inquiry

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The terms neoliberalism and neoliberal play a variety of roles ranging from major to trivial in the papers they appear in. Both phrases carry pejorative connotations in nurse writing. Yet irrespective of the role assumed in argument, readers are rarely provided with enough information to determine what the descriptors mean in a substantive or concrete sense. It is proposed that scholars who use these terms in their work should consider expressing themselves more carefully than often occurs at present. Virtue signalling in academic writing should, absent critical argument, be discouraged.

show abstract

“…In any case, it has received many criticisms (cf. DePoe, 2011;Hasan, 2013), and even some proponents of PC do not accept it (cf. Tucker 2013, p. 9).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Phenomenal Conservatism and the Demand for Metajustification

Oliveira

2017

Manuscrito

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper is on the justification of (PC), the epistemic principle defended by M. Huemer in his Phenomenal Conservatism theory. Put in a straightforward way, we can (and should) ask: what reasons are there for thinking that (PC) is true, that is, for thinking that appearances justify beliefs? This question corresponds -to use L. BonJour's vocabulary -to the demand for a "metajustification". The pursuit of this metajustification can take different directions, depending on the general conception or nature of epistemic justification we are working with and on who is supposed to satisfy the demand. Unfortunately, all of these directions seem to lead (PC) to a dead end. In other words, the apparently fair and even essential demand for a metajustification of (PC) cannot be met by the theory, at least in a satisfactory way. If we are right about that, it will remain the difficult question whether Phenomenal Conservatism is the only one (or even the right one!) to be blamed for this failure. We will briefly talk about that in the conclusion.--

show abstract

Defeating the self-defeat argument for phenomenal conservativism

Cited by 19 publications

References 6 publications

Acquaintance

Acquaintance

Neoliberalism and neoliberals: What are we talking about?

Phenomenal Conservatism and the Demand for Metajustification

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About