2010
DOI: 10.5089/9781455261307.004
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Default in Today's Advanced Economies: Unnecessary, Undesirable, and Unlikely

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Cited by 37 publications
(15 citation statements)
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References 6 publications
(7 reference statements)
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“…As debt increases, the primary balance also increases but the responsiveness eventually weakens and then actually decreases at very 3 There is a large body of literature on sovereign default, although most of these papers consider strategic default by developing seven country governments (see the survey by Eaton and Fernandez (1995) and the recent quantitative studies along the lines of Arellano (2008) and Aguiar and Gopinath (2006)). Here, we model default, not as an explicit strategic decision by the government, but rather as a result of the government's inability to rollover debt in the face of rising interest payments, given its primary balance reaction function (Cottarelli et al, 2010).…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…As debt increases, the primary balance also increases but the responsiveness eventually weakens and then actually decreases at very 3 There is a large body of literature on sovereign default, although most of these papers consider strategic default by developing seven country governments (see the survey by Eaton and Fernandez (1995) and the recent quantitative studies along the lines of Arellano (2008) and Aguiar and Gopinath (2006)). Here, we model default, not as an explicit strategic decision by the government, but rather as a result of the government's inability to rollover debt in the face of rising interest payments, given its primary balance reaction function (Cottarelli et al, 2010).…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Here, we model default as a problem of inability-to-pay, triggered by an inability to rollover debt in the face of rising interest payments and stochastic shocks to the primary balance. We believe that inability-to-pay rather than strategic default is more likely to be relevant for analyzing public debt in advanced economies (see alsoCottarelli et al, 2010).…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…1 This ignores temporary suspensions of payments in the interwar years by some gold standard economies (Bordo and Kydland, 1990;Eichengreen, 1991). A particularly unfortunate statement on the insulation of advanced economies from debt default is from another IMF study (Cottarelli et al, 2010), a statement made just months before the Greek default. Several analysts had seen the writing on the wall (Calomiris, 2010;Zingales, 2010;Buiter and Rahbari, 2010).…”
Section: (I) Debt Ratiosmentioning
confidence: 99%