Decisions of the Dual-Channel Supply Chain under Double Policy Considering Remanufacturing

Dai, Feng; Ma, Lei; Ding, Yangke; Wu, Guanghua; Zhang, Ye

doi:10.3390/ijerph16030465

Cited by 18 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 56 publications

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“…The goal of innovation cooperation is difficult to achieve, which shows that the policy instruments for GBT innovation cooperation are legitimate and reasonable. The findings of this study are generally consistent with previous studies [42]. Government intervention reduces the cost of technological innovation cooperation for green building enterprises, enhances the efficiency of resource allocation, and overcomes the market failure of GBT innovation.…”

Section: Conclusion and Contributionssupporting

confidence: 91%

Innovation Cooperation Network Evolution About Green Building Technology With Government Intervention: Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

Kong²,

Yang

et al. 2021

IEEE Access

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Section: Conclusion and Contributionssupporting

confidence: 91%

Innovation Cooperation Network Evolution About Green Building Technology With Government Intervention: Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

Kong²,

Yang

et al. 2021

IEEE Access

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“…Subsidy policies from local governments are also a crucial driving force for CEEs to implement strategies for carbon emission reduction [ 40 ]. In addition, carbon tax policies, especially bilateral dynamic taxes, are an effective means to control the carbon emissions of CEEs [ 41 , 42 ]. However, carbon emission reduction has increased CEEs’ production costs.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Implementation of a Multi-Agent Carbon Emission Reduction Strategy under the Chinese Dual Governance System: An Evolutionary Game Theoretical Approach

Wang

You

Liu

et al. 2020

IJERPH

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A central-local dual governance system is the basic system of environmental governance in China. Co-governance between the central environmental protection department (CEPD) and local environmental protection departments (LEPDs) is an important means to effectively promote China’s carbon emission reduction strategy. Accordingly, this paper discusses their interactive decision-making and investigates how to optimize the strategic relationships between the CEPD, LEPDs, and carbon emission enterprises (CEEs) under the dual governance system by constructing a trilateral evolutionary game model and analyzing evolutionary stability strategies, achieving a numerical experiment simulation of evolution processes and determining the impacts of various factors using MATLAB, leading to several countermeasures and suggestions. The results indicate that the CEPD should rationally use the incentive mechanism for LEPDs, improve the carbon tax system, and further penalize the nepotistic relationship of LEPDs and CEEs. Furthermore, it is essential to reform the current LEPD performance evaluation system and reduce the cost of LEPD positive regulation through subsidies and financial transfer payments. Additionally, the CEE strategy is affected by carbon reduction tax rates, penalties, subsides, and emission reduction costs and revenues. This study reveals the consequences of interactions between CEPD, LEPDs, and CEEs and presents options for the redesign of incentive and regulatory mechanisms to improve carbon emission reduction performance in China.

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“…Modak et al concluded that the optimal recycling rate increases with the CSR activity of the manufacturer, and a profit-sharing contract provides the best channel performance in a closedloop distribution channel consisting of a socially responsible manufacturer, multiple retailers, and a third-party collector [54]. Feng infers that win-win results can be achieved by establishing profit-sharing contracts considering the preference of green consumers [55]. Previous papers often focus on two aspects, including the choice of contract and the conditions of the contract.…”

Section: Cooperationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Study on Green Supply Chain Cooperation and Carbon Tax Policy considering Consumer’s Behavior

Liu

2020

Mathematical Problems in Engineering

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Carbon tax policy has been shown to be an effective incentive for the reduction of carbon emissions, and it also profoundly influences supply chain cooperation. This paper explores the interaction between carbon taxes and green supply chain cooperation. Specifically, we analyze the impact of a carbon tax on green supply chain coordination and further optimize the carbon tax to achieve a win-win situation for both the supply chain and the environment. Because consumer’s behavior has a significant impact on green product demand, we consider the problems above under two types of consumer’s behavior characteristics: consumer’s environmental awareness and consumer’s reference behavior. A game-theoretic model is employed to describe a green supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, combining important factors such as the carbon tax rate, green investment coefficient, and degree of reference effect. Then, we obtain the optimal carbon tax rate by balancing the total tax revenue and product greenness. A revenue-sharing contract is introduced to achieve green supply chain coordination, and the impact of the carbon tax on coordination is analyzed. The results show the following. (1) The carbon tax rate and the difference between the power of the manufacturer and retailer are the main factors determining green supply chain coordination. (2) Maximum greenness can be achieved when development costs are higher, while the maximum tax revenue is obtained when the development cost is lower, but with the loss of greenness. (3) If the power of the manufacturer is low, coordination can be achieved under the optimal carbon tax. If the power of the manufacturer is at a medium level, coordination can be achieved by increasing the carbon tax; as a result, increased greenness will be realized, but with the loss of tax revenue. However, when the power of the manufacturer is strong, coordination cannot be achieved. (4) Price reference behavior can promote supply chain coordination, but consumer’s environmental awareness cannot.

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Decisions of the Dual-Channel Supply Chain under Double Policy Considering Remanufacturing

Cited by 18 publications

References 56 publications

Innovation Cooperation Network Evolution About Green Building Technology With Government Intervention: Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

Innovation Cooperation Network Evolution About Green Building Technology With Government Intervention: Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

Implementation of a Multi-Agent Carbon Emission Reduction Strategy under the Chinese Dual Governance System: An Evolutionary Game Theoretical Approach

Study on Green Supply Chain Cooperation and Carbon Tax Policy considering Consumer’s Behavior

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