Decision rules and the search for a dominance structure: Towards a process model of decision making.

Montgomery, Henry

doi:10.1037/e445132004-001

Cited by 115 publications

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“…Another explanation, offered by the present authors (Montgomery, 1983;Montgomery et al, 1990), is that subjects in choices, but not in judgments, restructure the information such as one option dominates other options. If subjects, in order to attain dominance, emphasize differences between options on the prominent attribute and de-emphasize differences on the nonprominent attribute they would, in agreement with the prominence effect, make choices on the basis ofthe prominent attribute.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

The judgment‐choice discrepancy: Noncompatibility or restructuring?

Montgomery¹,

Selart²,

Gärling³

et al. 1994

Behavioral Decision Making

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The study examines the relative merits of a noncompatibility and a restructuring explanation of the recurrent empirical finding that a prominent attribute looms larger in choices than in judgments. Pairs of equally attractive options were presented to 72 undergraduates who were assigned to six conditions in which they performed (1) only preference judgments or choices, (2) preference judgments or choices preceded by judgments of attractiveness of attribute levels, or (3) preference judgments or choices accompanied by think‐aloud reports. The results replicated the prominence effect for choices, but a prominence effect was also found for preference judgments. In accordance with the restructuring explanation, the think‐aloud protocols indicated that options were more often restructured in choices than in preference judgments. However, restructuring could not explain the prominence effect observed for preference judgments. A modified compatibility hypothesis is offered as an alternative explanation.

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confidence: 99%

The judgment‐choice discrepancy: Noncompatibility or restructuring?

Montgomery¹,

Selart²,

Gärling³

et al. 1994

Behavioral Decision Making

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“…The suggestion has also been made that the prominence effect can be explained by a hypothesis based on Montgomery's (1983) theory of dominance structuring in decision making. This hypothesis states that the decision maker uses mental restructuring operations on a representation of decision options to make the options more clearly differentiated.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…It is assumed that reasons or motives guide the modifications of values and beliefs. Therefore, both Montgomery (1983) and Svenson (1992) assume that the importance of a decision is directly related to the degree of restructuring.…”

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confidence: 99%

Structure Compatibility and Restructuring in Judgment and Choice

Selart

1996

Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes

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The use of different response modes has been found to influence how subjects evaluate pairs of alternatives described by two attributes. It has been suggested that judgments and choices evoke different kinds of cognitive processes, leading to an overweighing of the prominent attribute in choice (Tversky, Sattath, & Slovic, 1988; Fischer & Hawkins, 1993). Four experiments were conducted to compare alternative cognitive explanations of this so-called prominence effect in judgment and choice. The explanations investigated were the structure compatibility hypothesis and the restructuring hypothesis. According to the structure compatibility hypothesis, it was assumed that the prominence effect is due to a lack of compatibility between the required output from subjects and the structure of information in input. The restructuring hypothesis stated that the decision maker uses mental restructuring operations on a representation of decision options to make the options more clearly differentiated. In Experiment 1, a matching procedure was used to provide pairs of equally attractive options (medical treatments) for the following experiments. In Experiments 2, 3, and 4, preferences were elicited with two different response modes, choice and preference rating. Value ranges on the prominent and nonprominent attributes were manipulated to test the structure compatibility hypothesis. Accountability was also subject to manipulation as it was assumed to stimulate restructuring. Since the prominence effect was not restricted to choices, and effects of value ranges were obtained but not of accountability, the results were interpreted in line with the structure compatibility hypothesis.

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“…Svenson (1992Svenson ( , 1996 cites evidence in support of a Ôdifferentia-tion and consolidationÕ theory, which proposes that people continue to acquire information until a particular candidate is ''sufficiently superior for a decision'' (Svenson, 1992, p. 143). Montgomery and colleagues (e.g., Montgomery, 1983;Montgomery & Wille en, 1999) propose a similar idea in the Ôsearch for dominance structureÕ theory in which information is structured and restructured ''in such a way that one alternative becomes the self-evident choice'' (Montgomery & Wille en, 1999, p. 148). Although these theories are typically applied to situations involving a greater number of alternatives and attributes (e.g., Harvey & Bolger, 2001) than in the experiments presented here, it is clear that they support the conjecture that people are not always satisfied to make a decision on the basis of one piece of discriminating information.…”

Section: Ecological Analysis Of Environmentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Empirical Tests of a Fast-and-Frugal Heuristic: Not Everyone “Takes-the-Best”

Newell¹,

Weston²,

Shanks³

2011

Heuristics

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The fast-and-frugal heuristics approach to decision making under uncertainty advocated by Gigerenzer and colleagues (e.g., Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996) has achieved great popularity despite a relative lack of empirical validation. We report two experiments that examine the use of one particular heuristic-''take-the-best'' (TTB). In both experiments the majority of participants adopted frugal strategies, but only one-third (33%) behaved in a manner completely consistent with TTBÕs search, stopping and decision rules. Furthermore, a significant proportion of participants in both experiments adopted a non-frugal strategy in which they accumulated more information than was predicted by TTBÕs stopping rule. The results provide an insight into the conditions under which different heuristics are used, and question the predictive power of the fast-and-frugal approach.

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Decision rules and the search for a dominance structure: Towards a process model of decision making.

Cited by 115 publications

References 0 publications

The judgment‐choice discrepancy: Noncompatibility or restructuring?

The judgment‐choice discrepancy: Noncompatibility or restructuring?

Structure Compatibility and Restructuring in Judgment and Choice

Empirical Tests of a Fast-and-Frugal Heuristic: Not Everyone “Takes-the-Best”

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