Abstract:We study a pessimistic stochastic bilevel program in the context of sequential two-player games, where the leader makes a binary here-and-now decision, and the follower responds with a continuous wait-and-see decision after observing the leader’s action and revelation of uncertainty. We assume that only the information regarding the mean, covariance, and support is known. We formulate the problem as a distributionally robust (DR) two-stage problem. The pessimistic DR bilevel program is shown to be equivalent t… Show more
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