Decision-making of online channels under three power structures

Jia, Xingxing

doi:10.1177/0020294019879172

Cited by 6 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 36 publications

(84 reference statements)

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…On the one hand, the scenarios where platforms act as resellers by reselling the products which they purchase from upriver manufacturers are studied. Jia [42] discusses the decisions of the supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one online platform which act as a reseller with three power structures. Given the risk attitude, Chen et al [43] study whether the e-commerce platforms can introduce the online channel under different power structures.…”

Section: Power Structure In E-commerce Supply Chainsmentioning

confidence: 99%

How Should E-Commerce Platforms Subsidize Retailers with Logistics Constraints during an Epidemic Scenario? Considering Power Structure and Altruistic Preference

Zhang

2021

JTAER

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

To maintain the sustainable development of a platform’s economy, e-commerce platforms put forward various subsidy programs to retailers selling on them during COVID-19. This paper investigates an e-commerce platform’s decision on subsidizing a retailer selling on it with logistics constraints during an epidemic scenario, with a focus on the role of power structure and altruistic preference. By constructing two Stackelberg game models, the research obtains the optimal subsidy under two power structures (i.e., the dominant platform and the weaker platform), respectively. The comparison between them shows that the conditions of the dominant platform giving subsidies (both altruistic preference and logistics constraints should be higher enough) are stricter than the weaker platform. Considering the same altruistic preference and logistics constraints, the optimal subsidy provided by the weaker platform should always be not less than the dominant platform. However, the weaker platform, surprisingly, can get more utility by lowering its altruistic preference voluntarily when the commission fee is low. No matter what the power structure is, the optimal subsidy increases with the logistics service coefficient and altruistic preference, and the dominant member’s profit/utility is not less than the weaker one, which confirms “the first mover advantage”. Finally, more managerial implications to the platform-retailer systems are discussed.

show abstract

Section: Power Structure In E-commerce Supply Chainsmentioning

confidence: 99%

How Should E-Commerce Platforms Subsidize Retailers with Logistics Constraints during an Epidemic Scenario? Considering Power Structure and Altruistic Preference

Zhang

2021

JTAER

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…In different modes, it is vital whether consumers accept them. Jia [31] investigated two e-commerce modes, selfowned platform and others-owned platform, and came to a conclusion that the channel service level and the sensitivity of consumers to channel service would influence the supply chain desicion. Li et al [32] compared the relation between direct online sales and brand stores and revealed that if the brand store was established first, the manufacturer might introduce the direct online mode; otherwise, it might not.…”

Section: Supply Chain Channel Selectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Offline and Online Channel Selection of Low-Carbon Supply Chain under Carbon Trading Market

Han

Yang

Zhang

et al. 2021

Mathematical Problems in Engineering

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper investigates the low-carbon product manufacturer’s different decision behavior in the offline traditional retail channel and online e-commerce channel when the carbon trading market has been established. The low-carbon product manufacturer is both in the carbon trading market and product market. In the former market, the manufacturer can gain profits by selling its emission quota. In the latter market, the manufacturer has two sales channel options, the traditional offline retailer and the online e-commerce platform. These two channels make two supply chains, the manufacturer-led offline one and the e-commerce platform-led online one. This paper combines the carbon trading market with the product market, formulates different Stackelberg game models, compares the manufacturer’s decision under two channels and the impact of channels on the carbon emission, does sensitivity analysis, and verifies the conclusions with numerical examples. Our findings are (1) the establishment of the carbon market will help the manufacturer reduce its carbon emission, especially for those sensitive to the carbon price and those with too much emissions; (2) whether the manufacturer turns to the online channel depends on the consumers’ sensitivity to the sales service, and consumers’ attention will guide the way to the online mode; (3) which mode is conducive to carbon emission reduction relies on the product type: the e-commerce platform does well for daily necessities of mass production while the traditional channel is better for experience goods.

show abstract

An analysis of price, service and commission rate decisions in online sales made through E-commerce platforms

Hasiloglu

Kaya

2021

Computers & Industrial Engineering

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Decision-making of online channels under three power structures

Cited by 6 publications

References 36 publications

How Should E-Commerce Platforms Subsidize Retailers with Logistics Constraints during an Epidemic Scenario? Considering Power Structure and Altruistic Preference

How Should E-Commerce Platforms Subsidize Retailers with Logistics Constraints during an Epidemic Scenario? Considering Power Structure and Altruistic Preference

Offline and Online Channel Selection of Low-Carbon Supply Chain under Carbon Trading Market

An analysis of price, service and commission rate decisions in online sales made through E-commerce platforms

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About