Decision-making of Green Tourism Supply Chain Considering Risk Aversion under Government Subsidy

Abstract

Based on Stackelberg game theory, a game model among the government, scenic spot and travel agency is established to address issues in the green tourism supply chain considering government subsidy and risk aversion. Equilibrium solutions for models under different circumstances are analyzed and compared, with numerical experiments conducted using MATLAB. The results of the study indicate that government subsidy have the power to mobilize enthusiasm within the scenic spot and further drive its development towards greener practices. Meanwhile, moderate government subsidies are advantageous in enhancing social welfare, but subsidy intensity must be cautiously controlled to avoid over-stimulation. Additionally, the enhancement of tourists' environmental awareness and the moderate increase in subsidy proportion both contribute to improving the greenness level of the scenic spot, bringing greater profits to the supply chain. Furthermore, the importance of risk aversion is evident in the decision-making process of supply chain management for the green tourism.