Decision Making in the Obama White House

Abstract

Presidents attract extremely smart, ambitious people to serve in the White House, but the quality of the advice the president receives depends upon how he or she uses the available talent. Chief executives face daunting challenges in evaluating the onslaught of information, judging the perspectives of their subordinates, and ensuring that they receive advice based on presidential perspectives rather than the priorities of their subordinates. Political scientists who study presidential decision making have come to consider several factors as central to understanding White House organization and process: the level of centralization, the extent of multiple advocacy, and the use of honest brokers to manage advice to the president. This article examines President Obama's decision‐making style with respect to these three factors and uses several case studies to illustrate them: economic policy, detainee policy, and decision making on the war in Afghanistan.

Rivals for Influence on Counterterrorism Policy: White House Political Staff Versus Executive Branch Legal Advisors

“…It is this decision, specifically, that Time Magazine reporters Calabresi and Weisskopf call the “turning point” in Obama's presidency (Calabresi and Weisskopf ). Klaidman confirms this characterization (as do Mann 2012b and Pfiffner 2011b). Other actions and journalistic accounts support the narrative that White House political aides were gaining greater influence at the expense of the legal professionals during the May‐August 2009 period.…”

“…All of these decisions were intertwined, all concerned sensitive issues exposing the vulnerability of the CIA (and prompting strong reactions from intelligence officials), and all occurred in spring and summer of 2009. Scholars and other analysts have concurred that these three controversies prompted a “turning point” in the Obama presidency, as it began to transfer responsibility for the legal aspects of counterterrorism policy away from its legal advisors and increasingly more toward its political advisors (Calabresi and Weisskopf ; Mann 2012b, 111‐15; Pfiffner 2011b, 249‐50). The advice of Holder and Craig lost influence, as that of Emanuel and other political aides increased, in very large part due to alarming poll results in spring 2009 showing that support for Obama among independents had dropped, and that his national security policy decisions played a role in that decline (Calabresi and Weisskopf )…”

Obama's Surge: A Bureaucratic Politics Analysis of the Decision to Order a Troop Surge in the Afghanistan War

“…As vice president, Biden maintained an important bureaucratic role as a presidential adviser and was charged with promoting his "counterterrorism plus" option by the president in an effort to balance the military's promotion of the surge and COIN (Pfiffner 2011). As vice president, Biden maintained an important bureaucratic role as a presidential adviser and was charged with promoting his "counterterrorism plus" option by the president in an effort to balance the military's promotion of the surge and COIN (Pfiffner 2011).…”

“…That outcome looked increasingly ominous as 2009 came to a close. Although recent works (Bapat 2010;Pfiffner 2011;and Wayne 2011) have examined aspects of the Afghanistan surge, the decision to surge has not been analyzed according to formal models of foreign policy decision making. The decision to surge in Afghanistan was also met with skepticism and reluctance in Congress and tepid support from the American public (Saine 2009;Nichols 2010).…”

Bureaucratic Roles and Positions: Explaining the United States Libya Decision

“…51 Donilon and McDonough often viewed foreign policy through the lens of national interests rather than values. 52 Other actors doubtful of another military commitment for over-stretched American forces included Biden, who had argued strongly against Obama's decision in 2009 on the Afghanistan surge. He thought that involvement in Libya was misguided and, politically, nothing but a downside.…”