Decision Making by Juries and Judges: International Perspectives

Greene, Edith; Wrightsman, Lawrence S.

doi:10.1002/0470013397.ch17

Cited by 3 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…Studies have shown that attorneys and prosecutors often have difficulty in judging whether a witness correctly identified the alleged perpetrator, memories are accurate, and a confession offers a truthful account of the suspect's deeds (Simon, 2012 ). Research in simulated and real legal settings has shown that an adequate model of judiciary decision making must include the role of human bias (Green and Wrightsman, 2003 ), for example, judges tend to explain a defendant's actions reflecting on their own past experiences and assumptions (Saks and Thompson, 2003 ). Likewise, there is evidence that attorneys and prosecutors underutilize probabilistic information and fail to understand a wide variety of statistical principles as well as methodological issues (McAuliff et al, 2003 ; Daftary-Kapur et al, 2010 ; Spellman and Tenney, 2010 ).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Likewise, there is evidence that attorneys and prosecutors underutilize probabilistic information and fail to understand a wide variety of statistical principles as well as methodological issues (McAuliff et al, 2003 ; Daftary-Kapur et al, 2010 ; Spellman and Tenney, 2010 ). Because of the influence of personal biases, attorneys and prosecutors given identical information may reach widely differing verdicts (Green and Wrightsman, 2003 ). For example, it has been found that final pieces of evidence have pervasive impact, the party going with argument as second is strongly advantaged and evidence occurring toward the end of the presentation is favored (Walker et al, 1972 ).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Is There a Conjunction Fallacy in Legal Probabilistic Decision Making?

Wojciechowski

Pothos

2018

Front. Psychol.

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Classical probability theory (CPT) has represented the rational standard for decision making in human cognition. Even though CPT has provided many descriptively excellent decision models, there have also been some empirical results persistently problematic for CPT accounts. The tension between the normative prescription of CPT and human behavior is particularly acute in cases where we have higher expectations for rational decisions. One such case concerns legal decision making from legal experts, such as attorneys and prosecutors and, more so, judges. In the present research we explore one of the most influential CPT decision fallacies, the conjunction fallacy (CF), in a legal decision making task, involving assessing evidence that the same suspect had committed two separate crimes. The information for the two crimes was presented consecutively. Each participant was asked to provide individual ratings for the two crimes in some cases and conjunctive probability rating for both crimes in other cases, after all information had been presented. Overall, 360 probability ratings for guilt were collected from 120 participants, comprised of 40 judges, 40 attorneys and prosecutors, and 40 individuals without legal education. Our results provide evidence for a double conjunction fallacy (in this case, a higher probability of committing both crimes than the probability of committing either crime individually), in the group of individuals without legal education. These results are discussed in terms of their applied implications and in relation to a recent framework for understanding such results, quantum probability theory (QPT).

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Is There a Conjunction Fallacy in Legal Probabilistic Decision Making?

Wojciechowski

Pothos

2018

Front. Psychol.

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“…Furthermore, the comparison could have numerous practical implications. For one, the comparative impact of biases on the different groups could guide the policy debate regarding the proper division of labor between lay people (i.e., jurors) and legal professionals (i.e., judges) in adjudication (Greene & Wrightsman, 2003;Vidmar & Hans, 2007). At a more abstract level, elucidating the psychological factors that underly the differences between the normative judgments of legal professionals and laypersons may possibly facilitate bridging these differences.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Biases in legal decision‐making: Comparing prosecutors, defense attorneys, law students, and laypersons

Teichman,

Zamir,

Ritov

2023

J Empirical Legal Studies

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Previous studies of judgment and decision‐making in adjudication have largely focused on juries and judges. This body of work demonstrated that legal training and professional experience sometimes affect attitudes and mitigate the susceptibility to cognitive biases, but often they do not. Relatively few experimental studies examined the decisions of prosecutors and defense lawyers, although they play a major role, especially in legal systems where prosecutors have a broad discretion in charging decisions, courts' discretion regarding sentencing is constrained, and plea bargains abound. This study directly compares laypersons, law students, and legal practitioners—including prosecutors and defense lawyers—in terms of their attitudes about the criminal justice system and their cognitive biases. It was found that the outcome bias and the anti‐inference bias influenced all groups similarly, but an irrelevant anchor only impacted the decisions of laypersons and law students, and not those of legal professionals. Prosecutors were significantly more inclined to judge a behavior as negligent and reach factual conclusions supporting a conviction. However, the hypothesis that the susceptibility of prosecutors and defense lawyers to cognitive biases would be affected by their role was not borne out. The article considers possible explanations for the reported findings, and discusses their policy implications.

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Law and Social Science: How Interdisciplinary Is Interdisciplinary Enough?

Bornstein

2016

The Witness Stand and Lawrence S. Wrightsman, Jr.

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Decision Making by Juries and Judges: International Perspectives

Cited by 3 publications

References 30 publications

Is There a Conjunction Fallacy in Legal Probabilistic Decision Making?

Is There a Conjunction Fallacy in Legal Probabilistic Decision Making?

Biases in legal decision‐making: Comparing prosecutors, defense attorneys, law students, and laypersons

Law and Social Science: How Interdisciplinary Is Interdisciplinary Enough?

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