Decision-Making Behaviour Evolution Among Pork Supply and Demand Subjects Under Normalisation of COVID-19 Prevention and Control: A Case Study in China

Ma, Li; Wang, Yidi; Teng, Yun

doi:10.3389/fpubh.2022.784668

Cited by 3 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 47 publications

(13 reference statements)

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“…In the presence of limited government supervision, ADR manufacturers tend to produce low-quality products and seek leniency from inspection agencies when obtaining marketing licenses. Lack of government monitoring and medical device inspection may lead to low-quality ADRs that have not undergone rigorous medical-standard manufacture ( 15 ). Low-quality ADRs sold to customers as a result of unethical business tactics can lead to an abundance of erroneous diagnostic results (i.e., false negative results and false positive results).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Regulating the product quality of COVID-19 antigen testing reagents: A tripartite evolutionary game analysis under China's legal framework

Huang

Wang²,

Feng³

et al. 2023

Front. Public Health

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Personal purchases of novel coronavirus antigen detection reagents (ADRs) for self-detection have contributed to the optimization of medical resources and containment of the COVID-19 pandemic. The recurring occurrence of false testing results in China has generated concerns regarding the quality of ADRs and the testing mechanism for medical devices. Academic viewpoints and remarks on the sensitivity, application possibilities, and product innovation of ADRs may be found in the extant scientific literature. However, the current research does not explore the microscopic product quality concerns that emerge throughout the production and marketing of ADRs. To explore strategic equilibrium circumstances and behavioral evolution processes, an evolutionary game model was developed to include ADR manufacturers, third-party medical device inspection agencies, and regulatory authorities. The results reveal that the quantity of illegal incentives, the cost of regulation, and the loss of government credibility have a major impact on the decisions of regulatory authorities and determine three potential systemic equilibrium states. To maximize social welfare, ADRs should be incorporated into China's medication price monitoring system in order to manage market prices. To cut regulatory expenses, the government should employ blockchain technology for traceable network regulation of ADR product quality. The government should also protect the people's right to free speech and encourage online reporting of adverse incidents caused by ADRs. The conclusions of this article can provide many developing nations with important insights for regulating the quality of ADR products.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Regulating the product quality of COVID-19 antigen testing reagents: A tripartite evolutionary game analysis under China's legal framework

Huang

Wang²,

Feng³

et al. 2023

Front. Public Health

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Behavioral decision-making of government, agricultural product producers, and consumers on agricultural product quality and safety regulation in a digital environment

Huo,

Liu

2024

Front. Public Health

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The quality and safety of agricultural products are related to people’s lives and health, economic development, and social stability, and have always been a hot issue of concern to the government and society. The rapid development of digital traceability technology in the digital environment has brought new opportunities for the supervision of agricultural product quality and safety, but the frequent occurrence of agricultural product safety incidents in recent years has exposed many problems such as the lack of governmental supervision, unstandardized production process of enterprises, and weak consumer awareness. To improve the cooperation efficiency of stakeholders and ensure the quality and safety of agricultural products, this paper proposes a dynamic model based on evolutionary game theory. The model incorporates the government, agricultural product producers, and farmers, and evaluates the stability and effectiveness of the system under different circumstances. The results of the study show that there are multiple evolutionary stabilization strategies in the tripartite evolutionary game model of agricultural product quality and safety supervision, and there are corresponding evolutionary stabilization conditions. There are several factors affecting the stability of the system, the most important of which are government regulation, severe penalties for agricultural product producers, and incentives. When these factors reach a certain threshold, the stakeholder cooperation mechanism can establish an evolutionarily stable strategy. This study contributes to the understanding of the operational mechanism of stakeholder cooperation in agricultural product quality and safety regulation in the digital environment and provides decision support and policy recommendations for stakeholders to promote the sustainable development and optimization of agricultural product quality and safety regulation.

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Evolutionary Game Analysis of Collaborative Prevention and Control for Public Health Emergencies

Ouyang

Zhao

2022

Sustainability

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In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, strengthening collaborative prevention and control of public health emergencies has become an important element of social governance. In the process of collaborative prevention and control of public health emergencies, there is a complex game relationship among government agencies, the Internet media and the general public. In order to explore the evolution process of participants’ behavioral strategies, a trilateral evolutionary game model is constructed, and a system dynamics approach is further adopted to simulate the heterogeneous effect of different initial strategies and epidemic spread probability on the evolution of strategies. The results show that the tripartite equilibrium strategies are (0,0,0), (1,1,1), and (0,1,1) during the early stage, outbreak stage, and resumption stage of COVID-19, respectively. Then, taking the resumption stage as an example, the system strategy will eventually stabilize at the equilibrium point (0,1,1) when the initial probabilities of these three subjects are all equal to 0.2, 0.5 or 0.8. When the initial probability of Internet media is set to be 0.2, the public’s strategies converge faster than government agencies. As the initial probability of Internet media increases to 0.5 or 0.8, the convergence time of government agencies will be shortened from 40 weeks to 29 weeks or 18 weeks, whereas the opposite is true for the general publicWhen the epidemic spread probability p2=0.5, government agencies reach the equilibrium strategy after 20 weeks. As p2 increases to 0.7 and 0.9, the convergence time of government agencies becomes 27 weeks and 31 weeks, and the Internet media and the general public will converge more quickly toward the stable strategy. This paper links the theoretical study with the realistic prevention and control of COVID-19 to provide decision-making support and policy recommendations for the scientific prevention, and contributes to the sustainable development of society.

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Decision-Making Behaviour Evolution Among Pork Supply and Demand Subjects Under Normalisation of COVID-19 Prevention and Control: A Case Study in China

Cited by 3 publications

References 47 publications

Regulating the product quality of COVID-19 antigen testing reagents: A tripartite evolutionary game analysis under China's legal framework

Regulating the product quality of COVID-19 antigen testing reagents: A tripartite evolutionary game analysis under China's legal framework

Behavioral decision-making of government, agricultural product producers, and consumers on agricultural product quality and safety regulation in a digital environment

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Collaborative Prevention and Control for Public Health Emergencies

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