Deception (Under Uncertainty) as a Kind of Manipulation

Krstic, V. D.; Saville, Chantelle

doi:10.1080/00048402.2019.1604777

Cited by 11 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 4 publications

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“…They will know that, even as they try to override the recommendation, they might still be subject to its force. Thus, we can see why, in the example of Krstić and Saville (2019) discussed by Klenk (2022), the Twitter user knows the Twitter algorithm is promoting content that will 'push her emotional buttons', but still feels the force of that content. Her knowledge of the intentions of the agents setting up the algorithm does not make it feel any less manipulative, because she cannot override it despite disagreeing with the reasons behind setting up the algorithm.…”

Section: Conditions For Non-manipulation: Situational Influencementioning

confidence: 99%

Manipulation in politics and public policy

Dowding,

Oprea

2024

Economics and Philosophy

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Many philosophical accounts of manipulation are blind to the extent to which actual people fall short of the rational ideal, while prominent accounts in political science are under-inclusive. We offer necessary and sufficient conditions – Suitable Reason and Testimonial Honesty – distinguishing manipulative from non-manipulative influence; develop a ‘hypothetical disclosure test’ to measure the degree of manipulation; and provide further criteria to assess and compare the morality of manipulation across cases. We discuss multiple examples drawn from politics and from public policy with particular attention to recent debates about the ethics and politics of nudge.

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Section: Conditions For Non-manipulation: Situational Influencementioning

confidence: 99%

Manipulation in politics and public policy

Dowding,

Oprea

2024

Economics and Philosophy

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“…4 Of course, deception narrowly construed as intentionally causing false beliefs in one's victim may thus be a proper subset of manipulation, and so there can be manipulation without deception narrowly construed (cf. Cohen, 2018;Krstić & Saville, 2019;Susser et al, 2019b). 5 Gorin (2014, p. 79) defends a similar conclusion in reference to a 'transparency norm' that requires 'that an interactive partner not hide her intentions in interacting when these intentions are relevant to the intentions or interests of the person with whom she is interacting.'…”

Section: Thesis: Manipulation As Hidden Influencementioning

confidence: 99%

“…In this case by Krstić and Saville (2019), the Americans were manipulated, despite the fact that they were not deceived by the Japanese and that they were aware of the scheme in terms of its affective influence (concretely, that there was an appeal to racist tendencies). Going digital again makes it straightforward to find a suitable case from everyday experience:…”

Section: Thesis: Manipulation As Hidden Influencementioning

confidence: 99%

(Online) manipulation: sometimes hidden, always careless

Klenk

2021

Review of Social Economy

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Ever-increasing numbers of human interactions with intelligent software agents, online and offline, and their increasing ability to influence humans have prompted a surge in attention toward the concept of (online) manipulation. Several scholars have argued that manipulative influence is always hidden. But manipulation is sometimes overt, and when this is acknowledged the distinction between manipulation and other forms of social influence becomes problematic. Therefore, we need a better conceptualisation of manipulation that allows it to be overt and yet clearly distinct from related concepts of social influence. I argue that manipulation is careless influence, show how this account helps to alleviate the shortcomings of the hidden influence view of manipulation, and derive implications for digital ethics.

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“…Some accounts focus on human deception and tend to provide an intellectualized analysis that cannot be straightforwardly applied to other living organisms (Carson 2010; Mahon 2007). In contrast, others seek a more general approach that could also accommodate nonhuman deception (Birch 2019; Fallis and Lewis 2019; Krstić and Saville 2019; Martínez 2019; McWhirter 2016; Shea et al 2018; Skyrms 2010). The latter tend to develop game-theoretic models, which focus on deceptive signals and have fueled lively recent debates regarding the correct definition of biological deception.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Deception as Mimicry

Artiga,

Paternotte

2023

Philos. sci.

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What is the nature of deception? What does it take for an organism to deceive another one? In this paper we address these questions by appealing to the concept of mimicry. More precisely, we argue that a fruitful perspective regards deception as an instance of mimicry rather than the reverse. Conceiving of deception as an instance of mimicry has a number of interesting consequences: it draws connections between different areas of research, it vindicates a functional approach to deception by providing a satisfactory answer to some recent objections, and it suggests some worries for game-theoretic approaches to deception.

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Deception (Under Uncertainty) as a Kind of Manipulation

Cited by 11 publications

References 4 publications

Manipulation in politics and public policy

Manipulation in politics and public policy

(Online) manipulation: sometimes hidden, always careless

Deception as Mimicry

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