Deception mechanisms of FDA‒AWACS against passive monopulse angle measurements

Abstract

Airborne warning and control systems (AWACS) serve as critical command and control centres in air combat operations, making them prime targets for strategic attacks. These enemy attacks typically rely on the accurate determination of AWACS combat positions using different direction‐finding devices. In particular, passive monopulse angle measurement systems locate AWACS by measuring the angles of signals emitted by AWACS radiation sources, thus rendering them vulnerable to attacks. Given the criticality of the airborne radars of AWACS in battle command and control operations, they must function continuously to monitor air and sea targets. Hence, AWACS cannot effectively evade electronic reconnaissance systems through tactics such as radar shutdown. To explore alternative measures, the authors investigate the deception mechanisms of an integrated frequency diverse array AWACS (FDA‒AWACS) against passive monopulse angle measurements. Using an established FDA signal model, the principles underlying two common monopulse angle measurement methods are first outlined. Subsequently, the angle estimation formulae typically used by these monopulse angle measurement systems to interpret received FDA radiation signals are derived. Additionally, the transmit beampatterns, amplitude patterns, and angle measurement deception capabilities of several typical FDAs are examined. Simulation results indicate that the FDA‒AWACS can theoretically deceive passive monopulse angle measurement systems to a certain extent. However, one‐dimensional uniform linear FDAs and other arrays using sinusoidal frequency offsets exhibit limited deception abilities. In contrast, arrays utilising cubic and quartic frequency offset achieve angle measurement errors exceeding 2° in far‐field scenarios.