Deception Detection Accuracy is a Predictable Linear Function of Message Veracity Base-Rate: A Formal Test of Park and Levine's Probability Model

Abstract

This study provided the first empirical test of point predictions made by the Park-Levine probability model of deception detection accuracy. Participants viewed a series of interviews containing truthful answers, unsanctioned, high-stakes lies, or some combination of both. One randomly selected set of participants (n0/50) made judgments where the probability that each message was honest was P(H)0/.50. Accuracy judgments in this condition were used to generate point predictions generated from the model and tested against the results from a second set of data (n 0/413). Participants were randomly assigned to one of eight base-rate conditions where the probability that a message was honest systematically varied from 0.00 to 1.00. Consistent with the veracity effect, participants in P(H)0/.50 condition were significantly more likely to judge messages as truths than as lies, and consequently truths (67%) were identified with greater accuracy than lies (34%). As predicted by the model, overall accuracy was a linear function of message veracity base-rate, the base-rate induction explained 24% of the variance in accuracy scores, and, on average, raw accuracy scores for specific conditions were predicted to within approximately9/2.6%. The findings show that specific deception detection accuracy scores can be precisely predicted with the Park-Levine model.

Deception, Detection, Demeanor, and Truth Bias in Face-to-Face and Computer-Mediated Communication

“…Since the vast majority of deception experiments use base rates of 50% lies and 50% truths in the material that participants judge, this truth bias leads participants to underestimate the lies and reduces accuracy (Levine, Kim, Park, & Hughes, 2006;Levine, Park, & McCornack, 1999;Park & Levine, 2001). However, a truth bias may not significantly reduce deception accuracy in many naturally occurring situations because rates of deception are usually much lower than 50% of all interactions (DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer, & Epstein, 1996;George & Robb, 2008;Hancock, Thom-Santelli, & Ritchie, 2004a;Serota, Levine, & Boster, 2010).…”

The Effect of Suspicion on Deception Detection Accuracy: Optimal Level or Opposing Effects?

“…Some cheated while others did not. Details regarding the process of creating the interview segments are reported in Levine, Kim, Park, and Hughes (2006). Based on the results of pilot testing, the stimulus tapes were modified for use in the current study by editing out the last interview question from each interview segment because that question implied suspicion, thereby negating the suspicion induction.…”

Effects of Veracity, Modality, and Sanctioning on Credibility Assessment During Mediated and Unmediated Interviews

“…Despite earlier research suggesting few differences between sanctioned and unsanctioned deceivers (Feeley, 1996), other researchers have argued vociferously that the experimental setting must include unsanctioned lies in order to activate the guilt response of the participant (e.g., Levine et al, 2006). Although our research found little difference in the guilt experienced between sanctioned and unsanctioned liars and thus did not account for any differences between these two conditions, sanctioning of the lie did have an effect on the likelihood of confessions: Unsanctioned deceivers were far more likely to confess than were sanctioned deceivers.…”