Deception and Evidence<sup>1</sup>

Silins, Nicholas

doi:10.1111/j.1520-8583.2005.00066.x

Cited by 64 publications

(39 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…72 For discussion of seamless transition cases, see Johnston 2004 andNeta 2008. For further criticisms of the idea that factive states are privileged with respect to justification, see Wedgwood 2002, Silins 2005, and Schiffer 2009 See McDowell (1982), Conee (2007), Wright (2008) and Logue (this volume).…”

Section: Part II Causal Featuresmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Epistemology of Perception

Susanna

Silins

2014

Oxford Handbooks Online

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Section: Part II Causal Featuresmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Epistemology of Perception

Susanna

Silins

2014

Oxford Handbooks Online

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“…An interesting question is what the connection is between the strength of the evidence we have for a proposition and our confidence in that proposition. For discussion of the relation between having evidence for p and having confidence in p, see Neta (2003Neta ( , 2008 and Silins (2005). Since our concern here is restricted to the questions of what evidence perceptual experience provides us with and why it is rational to heed it, we can bracket this issue for the purposes of this paper.…”

Section: Perceptual Evidence and Systematic Linkagementioning

confidence: 99%

The epistemic force of perceptual experience

Schellenberg

2013

Philos Stud

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What is the metaphysical nature of perceptual experience? What evidence does experience provide us with? These questions are typically addressed in isolation. In order to make progress in answering both questions, perceptual experience needs to be studied in an integrated manner. I develop a unified account of the phenomenological and epistemological role of perceptual experience, by arguing that sensory states provide perceptual evidence due to their metaphysical structure. More specifically, I argue that sensory states are individuated by the perceptual capacities employed and that there is an asymmetric dependence between their employment in perception and their employment in hallucination and illusion. Due to this asymmetric dependence, sensory states provide us with evidence.Perceptual experience plays at least three different roles in our lives. It justifies our beliefs about our environment. It brings about conscious mental states. It converts informational input, such as light and sound waves, into representations of features that we attribute to the world. Corresponding to these three roles, there are at least three fundamental questions that have motivated the study of perceptual experience.Epistemology-question: How does perceptual experience justify our beliefs and yield knowledge of our environment given that perceptual experience can be misleading (we may be subject to illusion or hallucination)? Mind-question: How does perceptual experience bring about conscious mental states in which our environment appears or seems a certain way to us (irrespective of the way our environment actually is)?

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“…Williamson objects to this second view on the grounds, ''such 18 See Feldman (2004) and Pryor (2000). 19 For defenses of ESM, see Audi (2001), Conee and Feldman (2004), Pryor (2000), and Silins (2005). 20 You cannot combine ESM with IKSE if you also insist that evidence consists only of true propositions.…”

Section: Knowledge Without Evidencementioning

confidence: 99%

Evidence and Knowledge

Littlejohn

2010

Erkenn

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According to Williamson, your evidence consists of all and only what you know (E = K). According to his critics, it doesn't. While E = K calls for revision, the revisions it calls for are minor. E = K gets this much right. Only true propositions can constitute evidence and anything you know non-inferentially is part of your evidence. In this paper, I defend these two theses about evidence and its possession from Williamson's critics who think we should break more radically from E = K.

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Deception and Evidence¹

Cited by 64 publications

References 29 publications

The Epistemology of Perception

The Epistemology of Perception

The epistemic force of perceptual experience

Evidence and Knowledge

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Deception and Evidence1

Cited by 64 publications

References 29 publications

The Epistemology of Perception

The Epistemology of Perception

The epistemic force of perceptual experience

Evidence and Knowledge

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Deception and Evidence¹