Decentralised binding of self-certifying names to real-world identities for assessment of third-party messages in fragmented mobile networks

Seedorf, Jan; Kutscher, Dirk; Schneider, Fabian

doi:10.1109/infcomw.2014.6849268

Cited by 9 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…Figure 1 [5] shows an example scenario of a mobile network after a disaster. Connectivity to the backbone or the Internet is broken, but certain parts of a mobile network infrastructure, e.g.…”

Section: Disaster Scenariomentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We have proposed a detailed scheme for decentralised message authentication in ICN in a previous publication [5].…”

Section: High-level Overview Of Schemementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Here we summarize our scheme on a very high level; we refer the reader to our previous publication [5] for a detailed description and analysis of our scheme. Our scheme is based on a Web-of-Trust (WoT).…”

Section: High-level Overview Of Schemementioning

confidence: 99%

“…The binding between self-certifying ICN names and a Webof-Trust is achieved as follows (see [5] for a detailed naming scheme and message flow): The WoT key-ID is equivalent to the self-certifying name part used in the ICN naming scheme. This ties the self-certifying name with the ID of the correct public key in the WoT, and thus transitively with the RWI in the WoT (e.g.…”

Section: High-level Overview Of Schemementioning

confidence: 99%

“…In this demonstration, we present our prototype implementation of a concrete mechanism we have proposed previously [5] for using a Web-of-Trust (WoT) in conjunction with self-certifying names to provide precisely this RWI-binding. We consider a decentralised scenario: fragmented (mobile) networks, where connectivity to centralized authentication entities and WoT keyservers is not available.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Demo overview

Seedorf¹,

Gill²,

Kutscher³

et al. 2014

Proceedings of the 1st ACM Conference on Information-Centric Networking

Self Cite

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Self-certifying names provide the property that any entity in a distributed system can verify the binding between a corresponding public key and the self-certifying name without relying on a trusted third party. However, self-certifying names lack a binding with a corresponding real-world identity. In this demonstration, we present the implementation of a concrete mechanism for using a Web-of-Trust in conjunction with self-certifying names to provide this missing binding. Our prototype runs on Android devices and demonstrates a decentralised message authentication scheme for any kind of content-oriented architecture. In the demonstration, we show how our proposed scheme performs-in terms of time needed to assess the trustworthiness of information retrieved-in a fully decentralised scenario: fragmented (mobile) networks. In such a scenario, connectivity to centralized authentication entities and Web-of-Trust key-servers is not available. Our scheme is hence executed solely on end-user terminals itself (which have limited processing capabilities).

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Section: Disaster Scenariomentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We have proposed a detailed scheme for decentralised message authentication in ICN in a previous publication [5].…”

Section: High-level Overview Of Schemementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: High-level Overview Of Schemementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: High-level Overview Of Schemementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

Demo overview

Seedorf¹,

Gill²,

Kutscher³

et al. 2014

Proceedings of the 1st ACM Conference on Information-Centric Networking

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Security, Privacy, and Access Control in Information-Centric Networking: A Survey

Tourani

Misra

Mick

et al. 2018

IEEE Commun. Surv. Tutorials

211

109

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Information-Centric Networking (ICN) replaces the widely used host-centric networking paradigm in communication networks (e.g., Internet, mobile ad hoc networks) with an information-centric paradigm, which prioritizes the delivery of named content, oblivious of the contents' origin. Content and client security, provenance, and identity privacy are intrinsic in the ICN paradigm versus the current host centric paradigm where they have been instrumented as an after-thought. By design, the ICN paradigm inherently supports many security and privacy features, such as provenance and identity privacy, which are still not effectively available in the host-centric paradigm. However, given its nascency, the ICN paradigm has several open security and privacy concerns. In this article, we survey the existing literature in security and privacy in ICN and present open questions. More specifically, we explore three broad areas: security threats, privacy risks, and access control enforcement mechanisms.We present the underlying principle of the existing works, discuss the drawbacks of the proposed approaches, and explore potential future research directions. In security, we review attack scenarios, such as denial of service, cache pollution, and content poisoning. In privacy, we discuss user privacy and anonymity, name and signature privacy, and content privacy. ICN's feature of ubiquitous caching introduces a major challenge for access control enforcement that requires special attention. We review existing access control mechanisms including encryption-based, attributebased, session-based, and proxy re-encryption-based access control schemes. We conclude the survey with lessons learned and scope for future work.

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