Debt Contracting on Management

Akins, Brian; Angelis, David De; Gaulin, Maclean

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2757508

Cited by 8 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 14 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…To ease information acquisition, shareholders may prefer to take a management role that either puts them in charge of specific aspects of their investment, or puts them in contact with those who are in charge. This is consistent with the debt setting of Akins, De Angelis, and Gaulin [2020, table II], who find that for small and risky borrowers (about 8.5% of the loans in their sample), lenders have some control over retaining or selecting managers by way of debt contracts. My findings also speak to the incompleteness of SCs.…”

Section: Contract Covenant Analysissupporting

confidence: 85%

Contracts Between Firms and Shareholders

Schoenfeld

2020

J of Accounting Research

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Theory predicts the existence of explicit bilateral contracts between firms and expert shareholders. I assemble and analyze a large-scale data set of these contracts. Using block investments from 1996 to 2018, I find that these contracts involve mainly corporate owners and activist owners, and often specify covenants pertaining to financing, trading, directorships, dividends, joint ventures, corporate investment, financial reporting, and information access. I also find that some of the contract covenants are stated in terms of accounting information, and that the prevalence of these contracts is significantly positively associated with measures of information asymmetry between managers and shareholders. Overall, this study provides some of the first systematic evidence on explicit bilateral contracts between firms and shareholders.

show abstract

Section: Contract Covenant Analysissupporting

confidence: 85%

Contracts Between Firms and Shareholders

Schoenfeld

2020

J of Accounting Research

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Given the variety and inconsistency of the aforementioned findings, some scholars have examined contingencies at the individual, organizational, and environmental levels that may influence the relationship between CEO tenure and human capital (Akins et al, 2020; Schoar & Zuo, 2017; Souder et al, 2012; Weng & Lin, 2014). Pertaining to individual‐level contingencies, Weng and Lin (2014) reveal that CEO newness—the combination of prior board experience, prior heir‐apparent experience, and tenure length—influences the relationship between CEO tenure and firm‐level strategic change.…”

Section: Five Key Research Themesmentioning

confidence: 99%

CEO tenure: An integrative review and pathways for future research

Darouichi

Kunisch

Menz

et al. 2021

Corporate Governance

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Research Question/Issue: Chief executive officer (CEO) tenure-the time a person spends in the CEO position-is a key observable characteristic of the CEO that has attracted considerable attention in the fields of management and accounting/finance.Yet, the research has evolved in parallel streams, and scholars have used CEO tenure as a proxy for various aspects of CEO givens and behaviors. The purpose of this paper is to consolidate, assess, and integrate the extant knowledge about CEO tenure from the fields of management and accounting/finance and, on that basis, stimulate future research.Research Findings/Insights: Our review reveals five key themes in CEO tenure research that have been studied across the management and accounting/finance fields: (1) CEO tenure and motivations; (2) CEO tenure and power; (3) CEO tenure and social capital; (4) CEO tenure and human capital; and (5) CEO tenure and stakeholder perceptions. We review the extant research along these research themes, highlighting the collective insights, contributions, and shortcomings within and between these themes.Theoretical/Academic Implications: Our review suggests that CEO tenure is a multifaceted, complex construct. To advance extant knowledge, we propose three pathways for future research: (1) substantiating knowledge within themes;(2) expanding knowledge across themes; and (3) advancing knowledge about temporal dynamics. We hope that research along those lines will help foster a richer and deeper understanding of the dynamic and complex nature of CEO tenure, which will also advance our understanding about CEOs in general.Practitioner/Policy Implications: Our study offers a comprehensive understanding of the nature of CEO tenure and its implications. Such an understanding can be leveraged to define appropriate policies and governance decisions that account for the dynamic nature of the CEO position.

show abstract

“…Existing studies generally focus on financial covenants or specific corporate policy restrictions and their impact on firm behavior. For example, Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2009), Becher, Griffin, andNini (2018), andAkins, De Angelis, andGaulin (2020) document creditor influence over borrower investment, acquisition, and CEO turnover policies, respectively. Our paper studies restrictions on equity block formation, which creditors can use to influence the borrower's ownership base.…”

Section: Related Literature and Hypotheses Developmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We construct our database following Akins, De Angelis, and Gaulin (2020). First, we use the link file from Michael Roberts (Chava and Roberts 2008) for merging a 2015 extract of DealScan with Compustat to obtain our initial sample of contracts.…”

Section: Database Constructionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…If MBRs are put in place primarily to benefit management, they should not be associated with an interest rate discount, as many other covenants are. To test this argument, we use methodology from Bradley and Roberts (2015) and Akins, De Angelis, and Gaulin (2020) to control for the simultaneity of loan pricing and covenant inclusion decisions. We find that the inclusion of MBRs is not associated with an interest rate discount, but rather generally with a premium, suggesting that MBRs do benefit management.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation