Debiasing by instruction: The case of belief bias

Evans, Jonathan St. B. T.; Newstead, Stephen E.; Allen, Julie L.; Pollard, Paul

doi:10.1080/09541449408520148

Cited by 129 publications

(112 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…However, there is a large interaction between these two factors, such that the effect of validity is larger for unbelievable than believable conclusions (Evans et al, 1983;Evans et al, 1994;Newstead et al, 1992;Thompson, 1996). This finding suggests that the execution of analytical/logical processes is constrained by the believability of the materials, such that logical processing is more likely to take place when considering an unbelievable as opposed to a believable or neutral conclusion (Newstead et al, 1992).…”

Section: Beliefs and Validity In Deductive Reasoningmentioning

confidence: 64%

“…The belief-bias effect refers to the tendency to accept a conclusion that accords with one's belief, regardless of whether that conclusion is in fact valid. This effect has been widely replicated (e.g., Cherubini et al, 1998;Evans et al, 1983;Evans, Newstead, Allen, & Pollard, 1994;Evans & Pollard, 1990;Feather, 1964;Janis & Frick, 1943;Markovits & BouffardBouchard, 1992;Markovits & Nantel, 1989;Morgan & Morton, 1944;Newstead et al, 1992;Oakhill & Johnson-Laird, 1985;Oakhill, Johnson-Laird & Garnham, 1989;Revlin et al, 1980;Stanovich & West, 1997;Thompson, 1996;Torrens, Thompson, & Cramer, 1999). In contrast to the rather pessimistic view of human rationality suggested by the belief-bias effect, however, it has also been widely observed that reasoners accept more valid than invalid conclusions, regardless of believability (Evans et al, 1983;Evans et al, 1994;Newstead et al, 1992;Thompson, 1994Thompson, , 1996Torrens et al, 1999).…”

Section: Beliefs and Validity In Deductive Reasoningmentioning

confidence: 71%

“…In terms of the effects described here, the literature tells us that this is a plausible hypothesis: The effects of validity and beliefs can be manipulated (albeit with difficulty) by instructions that place relatively more or less emphasis on logical processes (Evans et al, 1994); the effects of belief and the search for counter-examples may be a matter of individual differences (Markovits, 1984;Torrens et al, 1999;Fugelsang & Thompson, 2000); and deductive reasoning in general is known to reflect task-specific as well as domain-independent processes (Thompson, 2000).…”

Section: The Relative Merits Of Within-and Between-subjects Designsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This finding suggests that the execution of analytical/logical processes is constrained by the believability of the materials, such that logical processing is more likely to take place when considering an unbelievable as opposed to a believable or neutral conclusion (Newstead et al, 1992). Moreover, the ability to account for this pattern of findings, and to predict occasions on which the pattern may change, is commonly used as a litmus test to discriminate among various theories of deductive competence (see for example, Evans et al, 1994;Klauer, Musch, & Naumer, 2000;Newstead et al, 1992).…”

Section: Beliefs and Validity In Deductive Reasoningmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As mentioned earlier, the default method is a within-subjects design whereby reasoners are asked to complete a large number of very similar reasoning problems. A quick review of several recent belief-bias studies (Cherubini et al, 1998;Evans et al, 1983;Evans et al, 1994;Evans & Pollard, 1990;Markovits & BouffardBouchard, 1992;Markovits & Nantel, 1989;Newstead et al, 1992;Oakhill & JohnsonLaird, 1985;Oakhill et al, 1989;Revlin et al, 1980;Stanovich & West, 1997;Thompson, 1996;Torrens et al, 1999) indicated that the median number of problems reasoners are asked to solve is 8 (mean=9) ; typically, reasoners are asked to solve some multiple of four (allowing one problem in each belief by validity cell) or six problems (when a neutral belief condition is included).…”

Section: The Relative Merits Of Within-and Between-subjects Designsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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A Power Struggle: Between- Vs. Within-Subjects Designs in Deductive Reasoning Research

Thompson

Campbell

2004

PSYCHOLOGIA -An International Journal of Psychological Sciences

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This experiment examined the relative merits of using within-and between-subjects designs to investigate deductive reasoning. Two issues were investigated: 1) the potential for expectancy and fatigue effects when using within-subjects designs, and 2) the relative power of within-vs between-subjects designs. Participants were presented with problems in a standard belief-bias paradigm in which the believability of putative conclusions varied orthogonally to their validity. The belief bias effect, as well as the effect of validity, and the interaction between beliefs and validity, were not affected by reasoners' expectations regarding the number of problems they had to solve. The effect of beliefs and the belief by validity interaction were only marginally affected by the number of problems solved, despite adequate power to observe an effect. Thus, neither expectancy nor fatigue appear to have affected performance, suggesting that there are few drawbacks to using a within-subjects design. In contrast, however, a power analysis clearly established the desirability of using within-relative to between-subjects designs. Withinsubjects designs require far fewer participants to detect effects of comparable size; this was especially true for higher-order (interaction) effects. Finally, we provide a power analysis of within-and between-subjects designs that should be of general utility to researchers planning studies using proportions as a dependent measure.Key words: belief bias, deductive reasoning, statistical power, expectancy effects, carryover effectsThe default method for investigating deductive reasoning is a within-subjects design in which participants are asked to solve a large number of problems in a single sitting

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Section: Beliefs and Validity In Deductive Reasoningmentioning

confidence: 64%

Section: Beliefs and Validity In Deductive Reasoningmentioning

confidence: 71%

Section: The Relative Merits Of Within-and Between-subjects Designsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Beliefs and Validity In Deductive Reasoningmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Relative Merits Of Within-and Between-subjects Designsmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

A Power Struggle: Between- Vs. Within-Subjects Designs in Deductive Reasoning Research

Thompson

Campbell

2004

PSYCHOLOGIA -An International Journal of Psychological Sciences

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Reasoning

Rips

2002

Stevens' Handbook of Experimental Psychology

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Some current theories portray human reasoning as the result of a single cognitive process that operates in a uniform way across all domains of knowledge. This unitary process handles both entailments (given information guarantees the conclusion) and inductively strong inferences (given information makes the conclusion more likely). Other theories partition reasoning into two or more types that differ according to the domain of knowledge to which they apply, the kind of inference (entailment vs. inductively strong inference) they implement, or other psychological properties (rule‐based vs. similarity‐based, explicit vs. implicit, analytic vs. holistic, decontextual vs. context‐bound, and so on). This chapter surveys both unitary and partitioning theories, as well as the experimental evidence that supports them. Unitary theories run into difficulties with simple inferences that people endorse but the favored method doesn't explain. Partitioning theories gain from flexibility, but often fail to distinguish their component processes in an adequate way. In some cases, evidence for multiple processes may be due instead to multiple knowledge sources; in others, the processes are described too vaguely to do serious psychological work.

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Changing beliefs in repressed memory and dissociative amnesia

Otgaar

Mangiulli

Riesthuis

et al. 2022

Applied Cognitive Psychology

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In three studies, we examined whether beliefs in repressed memory and dissociative amnesia could be changed. Participants provided agreement ratings to statements related to repressed memory and dissociative amnesia. Then, they received a university course which included education on the science of memory. Following this, participants had to re-rate the statements. In Study 3, at Times 1 and 2, participants also received a case vignette on a therapy-induced recovered memory and rated several statements related to this case. Participants who received education on the science of memory were less likely to agree with statements endorsing repressed memory and dissociative amnesia-and participants were more likely to state that the case vignette involved a false memory. Providing education on the science of memory can help people (e.g., legal professionals, people from the general population) to use critical thinking on the topic of repressed memory and dissociative amnesia.

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Debiasing by instruction: The case of belief bias

Cited by 129 publications

References 22 publications

A Power Struggle: Between- Vs. Within-Subjects Designs in Deductive Reasoning Research

A Power Struggle: Between- Vs. Within-Subjects Designs in Deductive Reasoning Research

Reasoning

Changing beliefs in repressed memory and dissociative amnesia

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