Death versus GDP! Decoding the Fatality Indicators on Work Safety Regulation in Post-Deng China

Abstract

This article examines how Chinese reformers have used a set of "fatality indicators" to deal with the serious work safety situation in the past two decades. It argues that the system of fataUty indicators is a prudent strategy to tackle the responsibility deficiencies in the previous work safety regulatory system and strengthen the central government's supervision over local safety management. The primary purpose of implementing the fatality indicators is to shift local officials' focus from a GDP-centred growth mode to a new mindset of achieving a balance between economic development and social stability in local governance. The article also indicates that the decline in work-related fatalities in recent years is evidence of the effectiveness of the fatality indicators. These achievements aside, however, the introduction of fatality indicators is closely associated with an increase in local officials' dishonest reporting of real death tolls and the fluctuation in very serious accidents.

Creative Incrementalism: Governance Reforms in China Since 1978

“…While local officials of good performance had a higher chance of promotion (Gao 2009), low performance may lead to despise and punishment. A result-oriented and pressure-driven system was created along the hierarchy (Chan and Gao 2012). Such pressure was also strengthened by competition among peers.…”

The politics of performance measurement in China

“…High-performing local elites are selected to move upward (Gao, 2009;Guo, 2007). From central to township governments, 6 a result-oriented PM system continuously disaggregates and assigns PM targets (Chan & Gao, 2012), replacing the old planning system that directly controlled local resources and activities. Consistent downward PM pressures are imposed from above.…”

Political rationality vs. technical rationality in China's target-based performance measurement system: The case of social stability maintenance

“…These targets first appeared in local governments' performance assessments in 2004, following the central leaders' establishment of the Work Safety Commission of the State Council in 2003 to deal with the serious work safety situation in local China. Since then, the Work Safety Commission has developed a group of fatality indicators (work safety control evaluation indicators) on an annual basis and assigned these targets to local governments at all levels (Chan & Gao, 2012). Table 1 Targets for social stability assigned to Zhouzhi County in 2010.…”

“…As some studies have shown, Chinese leaders in the reform era have relied heavily on this system as a political instrument to enhance the party-state's capacity to ensure policy compliance across the vast local bureaucracy (Burns & Zhou, 2010;Edin, 2003;Gao, 2009). The result has been both impressive progress and serious problems in local governance (Chan & Gao, 2012;O'Brien & Li, 1999). Despite the valuable contributions of these studies, they provide inadequate discussion of how the TRS's political function affects its technical power.…”

“…Second, it contributes to scholarship on China's contentious politics by analyzing a key mechanism that China's national leaders have adopted to deal with rising social tensions. Although several studies mention the importance of performance evaluation in maintaining social stability, they either do not provide adequate empirical analysis of the design of this strategy (Li, Liu, & O'Brien, 2012), or they examine the use of TRS in social stability maintenance from a specific perspective-for example, as a tool for controlling work-related fatalities (Chan & Gao, 2012). This study will use firsthand data to provide a more comprehensive analysis of how the TRS is used to maintain social stability at local levels.…”