Dealing with a “Rogue State”: The Libya Precedent

Schwartz, Jonathan B.

doi:10.1017/s0002930000029791

Cited by 16 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…By 1979, when Egypt and Israel signed the Camp-David treaty, the Libyan government-like Syria-firmly rejected it (CIA 1982a). As a response, the US designated Libya as a state sponsor of terrorism under the Export Administration Act on 29 December 1979 (Schwartz 2007), enforcing an economic embargo on spare parts in the aviation and oil fields. During these years, the various US administrations were already discussing and assessing plans on how to curb Libya's regional influence in Africa and the Middle East (Burton and Howard 2014, Document 18).…”

Section: Anti-colonial and Regional Solidaritymentioning

confidence: 99%

Theorising Sanctions as Warfare: Insights from the US-Led Aggression on Libya

Capasso

2023

WRPE

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Conventional literature on sanctions tends to overfocus on measuring their political efficacy on targeted countries, accused of carrying out terrorist activities. More critically, other studies have focused on the ethical problems arising from the consequences that sanctions have on entire populations. Departing from these approaches, this article draws on Fidel Castro’s concept of the “Battle of Ideas” and argues that sanctions should be studied as a form of US-led imperialist warfare over the Global South. Taking the case of Libya, the article relies on archival sources (CIA [Central Intelligence Agency], US and Libyan government, and UN documents) as well as secondary literature, and argues that sanctions act as a form of economic warfare that supplants or complements the use of other forms of warfare, including military and non-military. In doing so, the article calls for a deeper and renewed engagement with the Third-Worldist Marxist theoretical lineage, when studying the question of financial subordination, dependency, war, and imperialism in the Arab world, and the Global South at large.

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Section: Anti-colonial and Regional Solidaritymentioning

confidence: 99%

Theorising Sanctions as Warfare: Insights from the US-Led Aggression on Libya

Capasso

2023

WRPE

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“…The ILSA in effect “blacklisted foreign firms for their activities in Libya” (Schwartz, 2007: 564), and was designed “to deter investment by non-US companies in [Libya’s] oil production sectors” (Meyer, 2008: 929). The violation of US secondary financial sanctions could result in the denial of access to US capital and any import–export financing or support for non-US firms and financial actors (Meyer, 2008: 929).…”

Section: Successful Sanctions Relief In the Case Of Libyamentioning

confidence: 99%

The shadow of sanctions: reputational risk, financial reintegration, and the political economy of sanctions relief

Raynor

2022

European Journal of International Relations

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Financial sanctions have become a major component of American foreign policy. Since 2015, the number of blacklisted actors has nearly tripled, coinciding with US financial campaigns against Iran, North Korea, and Russia. This paper centers an under-examined paradox of this proliferation: the complexity of lifting financial sanctions. Indeed, successful sanctions regimes necessitate both sticks (punitive sanctions) and carrots (economic incentives). Yet financial sanctions often limit the economic benefits promised to target states, as banks and other financial institutions risk hefty material and reputational costs if they are to cooperate with previously sanctioned actors. Thus, while financial sanctions are effective at producing negative market reactions against a target, they can be hugely damaging if market actors do not cooperate with the lifting of sanctions. To capture this dynamic, this paper leverages process-tracing to observe financial market reactions to sanctions relief in three key cases—Iran (2010–2015), North Korea (2002–2007), and Libya (1996–2008). It finds that in each case, the presence or absence of US Treasury blacklisting corresponds to the post-sanction willingness of financial actors to extend sanctions relief to targeted states. In doing so, this study identifies “reputational risk” as the primary causal mechanism limiting a target’s reintegration into the global economy.

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“…What is critically indicative of negotiations of this type is that, in this case, external concessions on the part of the victim states determined the amount of compensation. Moreover, when in 2003 one concession (to remove Libya from the US 'list of designated state sponsors of terrorism' (Beckham, 2015) was not fulfilled timely 84 , Libya did not provide the third transfer to the victims (Schwartz, 2007). Eventually, they approved the transfer in 2008, only after the US had removed Libya from the list in 2006 85 .…”

Section: The Value Of Passengers' Lives -Is There a Standard?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Legal consequences for the state arising from the use of weapons against civil aircraft: review and legal framework development

Novikova

Kuts

2021

Vestn. Ross. univ. družby nar., Ser. Ûrid. nauki

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The authors elaborate on one of the controversial issues of international air law - safety of civil aircraft in flight in respect of the use of weapons against it. The first part of the present article considers major aerial accidents arising from shooting down the civil aircraft for the last 70 years as a factual basis for further legal analysis. In the second part, the authors back up customary prohibition of the use of weapons against civil aircraft in flight and legal consequences for states for violating the mentioned principle. The authors investigate the grounds for the security exception and conclude that the only grounds for derogation from the principle of non-use of weapons against civil aircraft is Article 51 of the UN Charter proclaiming the inherent right of the state to self-defence. Even in this case, the application of the security exception by the state is tolerated by using a set of precautions before employment of weapons. Finally, authors conclude that compensation for victims reflects the inevitable monetisation of human lives. Moreover, states negotiations reveal the controversial reality of trade-offs between them, where compensation amounts are occasionally affected by external political factors and current position of a particular state in the international community.

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Dealing with a “Rogue State”: The Libya Precedent

Cited by 16 publications

References 9 publications

Theorising Sanctions as Warfare: Insights from the US-Led Aggression on Libya

Theorising Sanctions as Warfare: Insights from the US-Led Aggression on Libya

The shadow of sanctions: reputational risk, financial reintegration, and the political economy of sanctions relief

Legal consequences for the state arising from the use of weapons against civil aircraft: review and legal framework development

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