De-noising and spoofing extraction from position solution using wavelet transform on stationary single-frequency GPS receiver in immediate detection condition

Abstract

The growing dependence of critical civil infrastructure on global positioning system (GPS) makes GPS interference not only a safety threat, but also a matter of national security. The research done in this paper is initiated by the need to diminish this trouble on GPS based positioning. The suggested compensation technique assumes that the presence of a spoofing signal is immediately determined. The position residuals of the last authentic and new fake signals are passed to the wavelet transform (WT). We utilized WT for de-noising. Afterwards, position deviations due to an attack can be extracted and then the estimated position of the received signal will be corrected. As a primary step, the proposed algorithm has been implemented in a stationary software GPS receiver to prove the concept of the idea. The performance of the technique is validated using several laboratory and measurement data sets. Interference mitigation having tolerance of 3% and average of 99.5% is yielded on laboratory data set and complete compensation is achieved on measurement data set. The test results show that the proposed technique supremely gain strength the reliability of civil stationary GPS receiver against interference.

Prediction‐discrepancy based on innovative particle filter for estimating UAV true position in the presence of the GPS spoofing attacks

“…The pseudo‐range between GPS satellite vehicles to the GPS receiver is calculated from [1] where is the measured pseudo‐range between the mth satellites to the GPS receiver, represents the real distance between receiver and satellites where is receiver position and is satellite vehicles position in ECEF coordinates, c is the speed of light, is the receiver's clock offset and stands for the total effect of satellite's clock offset, ionospheric and tropospheric delays and the term of errors due to inaccurate modelling, receiver noise and multipath. Denoting the known position of satellite vehicles, the measurement of the GPS receivers are given by the following non‐linear observation model where is the non‐linear observation function in the GPS receiver, is the high position error as an additive measurement noise which is described in [22] and models the GPS spoofing that impacts on the GPS receiver position and …”

“…It is assumed that high position error is added to the GPS position calculation, because of the GPS spoofing attacks. According to [22], the errors higher than 500 m are considered as high position error. The GPS receiver operations are performed in radio frequency (RF) signal processing block.…”

Optimal decision for the satellite navigation system under navigation countermeasures based on spoofing effect evaluation results

“…To solve the first limitation, we first sort and list the key techniques of GNSS spoofing (i.e. a relatively easily achieved generative spoofing [20], a more complex generative spoofing [7], and forwarding spoofing [21]) and anti‐spoofing (i.e. the anti‐spoofing technologies based on the encryption and authentication of navigation signals [22], the signal characteristics [23], and the auxiliary information [24]) and their features (i.e.…”

A Novel GPS Meaconing Spoofing Detection Technique Based on Improved Ratio Combined with Carrier-to-Noise Moving Variance

“…A spoofing system using software defined radio (SDR) was tested and proved useful by Mosavi [6]. However, it is obviously difficult for a spoofer to know the status of a target receiver unless the target is a willing victim, which invokes the idea of meaconing; the simplest way to conduct a spoofing attack [7].…”