De-Naturalizing the Natural Attitude: A Husserlian Legacy to Social Phenomenology

Weiss, Gail

doi:10.1163/15691624-12341302

Cited by 11 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 5 publications

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“…One can indeed gain many phenomenological insights while remaining in it. Gail Weiss (2016) discusses this point in her article "De-Naturalizing the Natural Attitude: A Husserlian Legacy to Social Phenomenology," showing the diversity and frequency of experiences which can disrupt the natural attitude from within, as it were. She references, as an example, how the Rodney King and Trayvon Martin cases "profoundly disrupted the natural attitude of many white Americans" by putting in question their assumptions about fairness and justice in the United States (13).…”

Section: Critical Phenomenology: Turning To Phenomena Through a Plurality Of Attitudesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…At the same time, it should be noted that another feature of the natural attitude is that it quite forcefully resists radical change. Weiss (2016) nonetheless concludes: These experiences and these conversations are precisely what are needed, not to eradicate the natural attitude, for that is neither possible nor desirable, but rather to guarantee that it will continue to transform, rather than remain fixed, in response to new experiences that pose challenges to it. This, for me, is precisely the promise of the not so natural, natural attitude, as Husserl first described it over a century ago (.…”

Section: Critical Phenomenology: Turning To Phenomena Through a Plurality Of Attitudesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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What is Phenomenological about Critical Phenomenology? Guenther, Al-Saji, and the Husserlian Account of Attitudes

Laferté-Coutu

2021

PJCP

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Since Gayle Salamon’s 2018 article “What is Critical about Critical Phenomenology?”, phenomenologists and critical theorists have offered various responses to the question this title poses. In doing this, they articulated the following considerations: is renewed criticality targeting the phenomenological method itself, does it expand its subject matter to marginalized experiences, does it retool key phenomenological concepts? One aspect of this debate that has been left under-interrogated, however, is the word “phenomenology” itself. There is after all another question to ask in this context: what is phenomenological about critical phenomenology? Many avenues of response are of course possible. Phenomenology could most broadly be meant as an approach that concerns itself with what is given in experience in order to describe the structures of that givenness. From a Husserlian perspective, pure phenomenology is the science which concerns itself with phenomena in the full and diverse sense of the word—not as understood by specific natural or human sciences. What is distinctive of phenomenology is thus not what subset or type of phenomena it is interested in but how it relates to them, which, as Husserl introduces Ideas I, happens “in a completely different attitude.”

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Section: Critical Phenomenology: Turning To Phenomena Through a Plurality Of Attitudesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Critical Phenomenology: Turning To Phenomena Through a Plurality Of Attitudesmentioning

confidence: 99%

What is Phenomenological about Critical Phenomenology? Guenther, Al-Saji, and the Husserlian Account of Attitudes

Laferté-Coutu

2021

PJCP

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“…3 3 Although Weiss gives a more complex reading, arguing that shifts in the natural attitude do not necessarily hinge on a phenomenological reduction, since the latter reveals rather than challenges it (2016, pp. 10–11). …”

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confidence: 99%

Critical phenomenology and the banality of white supremacy

Ngo

2022

Philosophy Compass

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Critical phenomenology is a rapidly flourishing field of research within philosophical phenomenology. This article undertakes a genealogy of the critical philosophical enterprise, drawing out its key commitments, motivations, tensions, and productive potential. In the second half of this article, I explore the promise of critical phenomenology, by examining how a critical phenomenological approach to questions of racism and racialised embodiment can help extend our understanding of white supremacy, opening up new possibilities for thinking its banality and ubiquity in contemporary social and political life.

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“…See, for example,Oksala (2006), Al-Saji (2010,Heinämaa (2013),Weiss (2016), andGuenther (2017).3 To such a problem James Ostrow draws attention in his 1990 study on Social Sensitivity. A Study of Habit and Experience,…”

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confidence: 99%

Social sensitivity and the ethics of attention

Magrì

2021

European J of Philosophy

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Social sensitivity is a crucial aspect of interpersonal relationships, as it is intrinsic to the understanding of other selves as subjects situated in a social world. In revitalizing such a concept in the philosophical literature, this article examines the relation between habit, attention, and critical self-awareness that lies at the core of social sensitivity. On the one hand, I reconsider the so-called "passivity" of habit and tackle the role of attention as the power of varying point of view. On the other hand, I contrast Husserl's view of attentiveness with Murdoch's account of loving attention, arguing that social sensitivity centers on a type of striving that is closer to Husserl's methodology than Murdoch's approach to moral perfectionism.We need more concepts in terms of which to picture the substance of our being; it is through an enriching and deepening of concepts that moral progress takes place. Iris Murdoch, "Against Dryness" (1961)Social sensitivity is a crucial aspect of interpersonal relationships, as it is intrinsic to the understanding of other selves as subjects situated in a social world. Like empathy, social sensitivity consists in understanding the states and feelings of others. Unlike empathy, however, social sensitivity is more directly concerned with the appraisal of the social horizon in which different subjects are positioned, and from which they may be variously conditioned or affected. Thus, social sensitivity bears discernment and attentiveness to the context in which intersubjective encounters take place, including how such situatedness is experienced by the subjects involved. A typical example of this is the teacher in the classroom, who is at once focused on the content to deliver while also paying attention to the reactions of her students as well as to her own role in the classroom. In this scenario, the teacher is presented with multiple focal

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De-Naturalizing the Natural Attitude: A Husserlian Legacy to Social Phenomenology

Cited by 11 publications

References 5 publications

What is Phenomenological about Critical Phenomenology? Guenther, Al-Saji, and the Husserlian Account of Attitudes

What is Phenomenological about Critical Phenomenology? Guenther, Al-Saji, and the Husserlian Account of Attitudes

Critical phenomenology and the banality of white supremacy

Social sensitivity and the ethics of attention

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