De facto and official exchange rate regimes in transition economies

Abstract

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The political economy of exchange rate regimes in transition economies

“…Greater trade openness is associated with a greater likelihood of pegging in Von Hagen and Zhou (2005b) and in Aisen (2004). The effect is not statistically significant or is opposite to expected in Klyuev (2002), Markiewicz (2006), and Von Hagen and Zhou (2005a). Trade concentration has a positive effect on the likelihood of adopting a peg in Von Hagen and Zhou (2005b) and a negative effect in Markiewicz (2006).…”

“…Trade concentration has a positive effect on the likelihood of adopting a peg in Von Hagen and Zhou (2005b) and a negative effect in Markiewicz (2006). Similarly, Von Hagen and Zhou (2005b) and Markiewicz (2006) find that financial development decreases the likelihood of a peg whereas Von Hagen and Zhou (2005a) report the opposite effect. Klyuev (2002) and Markiewicz (2006) find that high inflation is associated with a lower likelihood of a peg and Von Hagen and Zhou (2005b) find that the effect of inflation is not statistically significant.…”

Technical trading, monetary policy, and exchange rate regimes

“…Reinhard and Rogoff extend this analysis and introduce a system of 15 different classifications. von Hagen and Zhou (2002) analyze the determinants for the choice of official and de facto exchange rate systems and compare the causes of the fear of floating and the fear of pegging. Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger use a measure that combines the volatility of the level of the exchange rate, the volatility of the first differences of the exchange rate and the volatility of the foreign reserves to classify de facto exchange rate regimes.…”

Fear of Floating and Pegging: A Simultaneous Choice Model of De Jure and De Facto Exchange Rate Regimes in Developing Countries

“…2 See e.g Poirson (2001)Hausmann et al (2001);Alesina and Wagner (2006),Levy-Yeyati et al (2006), and VonHagen & Zhou (2005b).…”