Davidson’s Wittgenstein

Abstract

Although the later Wittgenstein appears as one of the most influential figures in Davidson’s later works on meaning, it is not, for the most part, clear how Davidson interprets and employs Wittgenstein’s ideas. In this paper, I will argue that Davidson’s later works on meaning can be seen as mainly a manifestation of his attempt to accommodate the later Wittgenstein’s basic ideas about meaning and understanding, especially the requirement of drawing the seems right/is right distinction and the way this requirement must be met. These ideas, however, are interpreted by Davidson in his own way. I will then argue that Davidson even attempts to respect Wittgenstein’s quietism, provided that we understand this view in the way Davidson does. Having argued for that, I will finally investigate whether, for Davidson at least, his more theoretical and supposedly explanatory projects, such as that of constructing a formal theory of meaning and his use of the notion of triangulation, are in conflict with this Wittgensteinian quietist view.

Davidson on Pure Intending: A Non-Reductionist Judgement-Dependent Account

“…Thus, he claims that the Quinean indeterminacy at most leads 20 I have argued for these claims in different places, especially with regard to the reading Verheggen and Myers have offered of Davidson. See, e.g., Hossein Khani, 2017, 2018b, 2019, 2020a Elsewhere I have explained how such a claim from Davidson is directly related to the sort of alternative reading he has of Wittgenstein. See Hossein Khani, 2020a.…”

“…1 It helps to clarify his complex remarks on triangulation, by treating it as an analogy sustaining his non-reductionism, rather than an argument for meaning determination. Davidson's non-reductionism can also explain why his treatments of the Quinean indeterminacy-underdetermination distinction and Kripke's Wittgenstein's sceptical problem are often viewed as extremely puzzling or even wrong, that is, his view of these problems as epistemological (see, e.g., Hossein Khani, 2017Khani, , 2018aKhani, , 2018bKhani, , 2019Kemp, 2012;Verheggen, 2017;Verheggen & Myers, 2016). These fruitful outcomes, among others, form the main motivation for my attempt to construe Davidson's view of intending as a non-reductionist JD account.…”

“… 21 Elsewhere I have explained how such a claim from Davidson is directly related to the sort of alternative reading he has of Wittgenstein. See Hossein Khani, 2020a.…”

“… 22 Davidson interprets Wittgenstein as pointing to a similar idea and thus Davidson's Wittgenstein dramatically disagrees with Kripke's Wittgenstein. I have discussed this in Hossein Khani, 2017, 2020a.…”

“…Platts (1997) and Malpas (1992) construed Davidson as a realist. Miller and Hossein Khani (2015) argue that Davidson's philosophy of language is compatible with both realism and anti-realism; I have argued (see Hossein Khani, 2020a) that Davidson can even be viewed as a Wittgensteinian Quietist. Verheggen and Myers (2016) and Verheggen (2017) have argue that Davidson is an absolute anti-Quietist.…”