David Mitrany and the Purposes of Functional Pluralism

Holthaus, Leonie

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-70422-7_7

Cited by 4 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 35 publications

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“…His belief in people’s innate cooperative inclinations places Mitrany in a tradition of early 20th-century British pluralists including guild socialists such as G. D. H. Cole and liberals such as Leonard Hobhouse who was his academic mentor. Though they differed in the extent of their radicalism and transformative ambition (Holthaus, 2018), pluralists concurred that inside existing (liberal) states patterns of voluntary association and cooperation were already evident and ripe for expansion. These states were constituted not by singular ‘peoples’ or ‘societies’ but by a ‘complex of associations held together by the wills of their members’ (quoted in Long, 1993: 360; also see Wright, 1978.…”

Section: International Functionalismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The past two decades have seen some resurgence of interest in international functionalism and a re-evaluation of the work of David Mitrany as its ‘founder’ and most influential exponent (e.g. Ashworth, 2017; Hammarlund, 2005; Holthaus, 2018; Steffek, 2015). Much of this work is inspired by the same underlying concerns that also animated Mitrany: a (qualified) scepticism of the state as a model of social and political organization and – by implication – a leeriness of centralizing and territorial models of international integration that seek (partially) to reproduce state-like structures at a supranational scale.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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International functionalism and democracy

Theiler

2022

European Journal of International Relations

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International functionalism as proposed by David Mitrany envisions non-territorial functional agencies to supplant the states system. Mitrany makes no provision for democracy in functional agencies. Instead, he assumes that the policies of international technocrats would be ‘technically self-determined’ and uncontested – a stance several critics deem antidemocratic and naive. A second, related criticism holds that even if functional agencies were formally democratic, democracy could not operate effectively since functional polities would be too ‘thin’ and fragmented to sustain democratic commitments among their members. The article qualifies the first charge and rejects the second. First, defined as an institutional decision-making principle, ‘technical self-determination’ is Mitrany’s add-on to the underlying functionalist logic, not an inseparable part of it. That logic instead holds that institutions work best if their form and scope of authority follow their function and that function-specific agencies therefore could meet some needs better than the state. Contra Mitrany, this does not privilege technocratic over democratic decision-making and it does not imply that functional agencies would be free from political conflict. Nor, second, would functional agencies necessarily be unsuitable for democracy in practice. Several strands of democratic theory suggest that even people who do not share a ‘thick’ communal identity can develop a commitment to meet shared needs democratically. If one accepts this, it loosens functionalism’s technocratic stigma, highlights its potential as a democratically viable alternative to both state-centric and supranational models of international order and broadens our conception of possible democratic futures.

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Section: International Functionalismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

International functionalism and democracy

Theiler

2022

European Journal of International Relations

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“…Rather, functionalists assume the prevalence of pluralist politics with multiple and diverse actors, who can and do make contact and build coalitions across national frontiers and national bureaucracies. Such a perspective is especially conducive for understanding the involvement of multiple actors as well as their modes of cooperation vis-à-vis common technical, political and economic issues (Holthaus 2018). The Caspian Sea region and the CEP are subject to more complex and interconnected dynamics than pure high politics.…”

Section: Geopolitical Views On the Caspian Sea Regionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The reality of environmental cooperation and the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea

Bayramov

2020

Central Asian Survey

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Using insights from classical functionalism, this article analyses the complex relationship between the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea and the Caspian Environment Programme (CEP). The article pursues three objectives. First, it shows how shared ecological issues challenged individual littoral states and brought their respective governments under the CEP umbrella in 1998. Second, it shows how key actors (UNEP, UNDP, GEF, and World Bankbesides states) are involved in shaping the politics of the Caspian Sea region and how their preferences, both political and economic, and networks affect the capacity, opportunity and will of governments (e.g., ministries, parliaments and presidents) to cooperate. Third, it explains the link between low environmental politics and the uncertain legal status of the Caspian Sea. I find that lessons learned from environmental cooperation spilled over into the discussion of the legal status of the sea, which culminated in the signing of the Convention.

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“… 5. Holthaus (2018), Sylvest (2009: 211–16), Weinstein (2007b). Notable exceptions include Bell (2016: 349–54), Schwarz (2011: 322–3), discussed below.…”

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confidence: 99%

Dissolving the colour line: L. T. Hobhouse on race and liberal empire

Tan

2022

European Journal of Political Theory

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L. T. Hobhouse (1864–1929) is most familiar today as a leading theorist of British new liberalism. This article recovers and examines his overlooked commentary on the concept and rhetoric of race, which constituted part of his better-known project of advancing an authoritative account of liberal doctrine. His writings during and after the South African War, I argue, represent a prominent effort to cast liberalism as compatible with both imperial rule and what he called ‘the idea of racial equality’. A properly liberal empire, he asserted, would dissolve the colour line. This article traces the arguments Hobhouse advanced to make this claim, and explores his motivations for doing so. I contend that Hobhouse drew on the idiom of race as a form of exclusionary rhetoric, to delegitimise rival accounts of liberal empire and to cast his own as properly cosmopolitan. This recovery, I suggest, offers payoffs for our understanding of both Hobhouse's political thought and, more broadly, the uses of ‘race’ in twentieth-century liberalism.

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David Mitrany and the Purposes of Functional Pluralism

Cited by 4 publications

References 35 publications

International functionalism and democracy

International functionalism and democracy

The reality of environmental cooperation and the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea

Dissolving the colour line: L. T. Hobhouse on race and liberal empire

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