Data Games: Sharing Public Goods with Exclusion

Abstract

A group of firms decides to cooperate on a project that requires a combination of inputs held by some of them. These inputs are non-rival but excludable goods, i.e., public goods with exclusion such as knowledge, data or information, patents or copyrights. We address the question of how firms should be compensated for the inputs they contribute. We show that this problem can be framed within a cost sharing game for which the Shapley value comes out as a natural solution. The main result concerns the regular structure of the core that enables a simple characterization of the nucleolus. However, compared to the Shapley value, the nucleolus defines compensations that appear to be less appropriate in the context of data sharing. Our analysis is inspired by the problem faced by the European chemical firms within the regulation program REACH that requires submission by 2018 of a detailed analysis of all the substances they produce, import, or use.

Procedural and optimization implementation of the weighted ENSC value

“…Once the players have received their payoffs in a transferable utility game (henceforth a TU-game), they may be dissatisfied and express an amount of complaint within a coalition. 4 The complaint of a coalition manifests its members' potential to create more utility if they decide to contest an allocation. When the sum of players' marginal contributions to the grand coalition cannot be covered by the worth of the grand coalition, we prove that the weighted ENSC value is obtained by lexicographically minimizing a complaint vector associated with a new complaint criterion, called the selfish complaint, which only depends on players' selfishness as well as their marginal contributions to the grand coalition.…”

Data Cost Games as an Application of 1-Concavity in Cooperative Game Theory

“…This paper broadens the game theoretic approach to the data sharing situation initiated by Dehez and Tellone [1]. The origin of their mathematical study is the data and cost sharing problem faced by the European chemical industry.…”

“…Definition 1 (see [1] with adapted notation). (i) A data and cost sharing situation is given by the 3-tuple DC = ( , D, C), where is the finite set of agents, D = ( ) ∈ a collection of sets ⊆ , ∈ , of data, and C = ( ) ∈ a collection of costs of data.…”

On compensation schemes for data sharing within the European REACH legislation

“…The coalitional function specifies for each coalition the total cost of acquiring the missing data available in the SIEF should its members cooperate. Such games in coalitional form are called data games and have been introduced in Dehez and Tellone [10]. Since all members of the SIEF have the obligation to cooperate, it is essential to find compensation vectors specifying how the data owners should be compensated by the other SIEF members.…”

“…Other articles dealing with the data sharing within the REACH legislation via games in coalitional form are Dehez and Tellone [10], which formulates the Core, the Nucleolus and the Shapley value on the class of data games, and Béal et al [4], which provides an alternative axiomatic characterization of the Shapley value and characterizations of equal surplus division values Games in coalitional form have also been employed extensively to tackle problems in Law and Economics but in the very different perspective of measuring voting power. We refer the reader to Bindseil and Hantke [6], Fedeli and Forte [12] and Algaba, Bilbao and Fernández [3] for the distribution of voting power within the various institutions of the European Union, and to Braham and Steffen [7], Leech and Manjón [18] and Casajus, Labrenz and Hiller [9] for studies of voting power in corporate finance.…”