2021
DOI: 10.1109/tcyb.2020.2969320
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Data-Driven False Data-Injection Attack Design and Detection in Cyber-Physical Systems

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Cited by 60 publications
(20 citation statements)
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“…Stealth attack design on a quantized networked control system has been solved in [14]. On the other hand, attempts on attack detection include centralized (and decentralized as well) schemes for noiseless systems [15], coding of sensor output along with χ 2 detector [16], comparing the sensor observations with those coming from from a few known safe sensors [17], the attack detection and secure estimation schemes based on innovation vectors in [18], data driven design and detection of FDI [19], neural network based detection of FDI [20], quickest detection of time-varying false data injection attacks in dynamic linear regression models [21], FDI detection in linear parameter varying CPS [22], Gaussian mixture model based detection and secure state estimation [23], and quickest detection of FDI using Markov decision process formulation [24]. Attempts on attack-resilient state estimation include: [25] for bounded noise, [26]- [28] for adaptive filter design using stochastic approximation, [29] that uses sparsity models to characterize the switching location attack in a noiseless linear system and state recovery constraints for various attack modes.…”
Section: A Related Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Stealth attack design on a quantized networked control system has been solved in [14]. On the other hand, attempts on attack detection include centralized (and decentralized as well) schemes for noiseless systems [15], coding of sensor output along with χ 2 detector [16], comparing the sensor observations with those coming from from a few known safe sensors [17], the attack detection and secure estimation schemes based on innovation vectors in [18], data driven design and detection of FDI [19], neural network based detection of FDI [20], quickest detection of time-varying false data injection attacks in dynamic linear regression models [21], FDI detection in linear parameter varying CPS [22], Gaussian mixture model based detection and secure state estimation [23], and quickest detection of FDI using Markov decision process formulation [24]. Attempts on attack-resilient state estimation include: [25] for bounded noise, [26]- [28] for adaptive filter design using stochastic approximation, [29] that uses sparsity models to characterize the switching location attack in a noiseless linear system and state recovery constraints for various attack modes.…”
Section: A Related Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Khojasteh et al [26] investigated a learning-based attack method to estimate the dynamics of a system through a nonlinear Gaussian process-based learning algorithm that attacked the control policy. Zhao et al [27] used subspace recognition technology to propose an attack method based on wrong data injection. The target of the attack was the state estimation error, and the coding matrix was used to detect the attack.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Remark From the viewpoint of defender, the attack detection for the proposed stealthy multiplicative attacks may be realized by designing appropriate coding matrices, 33,34 to make the gap metric between the coded signal subspace and the primary signal subspace larger than the stealthiness index.…”
Section: Optimized Stealthy Multiplicative Attack Designmentioning
confidence: 99%