Das politische System Kroatiens

Zakošek, Nenad; Maršić, Tomislav

doi:10.1007/978-3-531-91997-3_16

Cited by 7 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 12 publications

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“…Burić 2002;Peskin andBoduszyński 2003: 1132). The Sanader government shared the perception of full co-operation with The Hague as an attack upon national identity (Sekulic 2004: 475;Zakošek 2004: 723) -and thus did not consider the extradition of alleged war criminals as appropriate behaviour. Since we do not find governmental behaviour contradicting national identity and the alternative explanatory factor of political adaptation costs has no explanatory power, we conclude national identity to be the pivotal factor blocking compliance until 2005.…”

Section: Conflictive National Identity and Non-compliance -Phase 1 (2mentioning

confidence: 98%

National identity matters: the limited impact of EU political conditionality in the Western Balkans

Freyburg¹,

Richter²

2010

Journal of European Public Policy

101

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Political developments in South Eastern Europe raise serious doubts about the prospects for the effectiveness of the European Union's external democracy promotion via political conditionality. They make it questionable whether the European Union (EU) can repeat its success story as it is widely acknowledged in Central Eastern Europe. With reference to countries characterized by legacies of ethnic conflict, this article shows that incentive-based instruments only trigger democratic change if certain domestic preconditions are met. It will be argued that if national identity runs counter to democratic requirements, this will 'block' compliance by framing it as inappropriate action. The argument is empirically demonstrated using the example of one of the most problematic issue areas in Croatia, for which the EU has only partially succeeded in bringing about democratic change: the prosecution of war crimes.

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Section: Conflictive National Identity and Non-compliance -Phase 1 (2mentioning

confidence: 98%