Ever since German Rail, the largest state-owned enterprise in Germany, was converted into a stock company in 1994, the federal government has been criticized for a lack of policy ambitions. From a principal-agent perspective, the federal government gives the impression of being a reluctant principal. The first objective is therefore to explain the strategic interaction between the federal government and German Rail since the 1990s. The second aim is to increase the explanatory power of the principal-agent concept by adopting a strand of literature in which the principal's unilateralism and diverging preferences-standard assumptions in the principal-agent literature-are complemented by strategic cooperation, confluence, and inverted principal-agent interactions. This conceptual redirection, which considers the impact of a broader range of actors involved, not only explains key events in German rail policy but also highlights the advances of an elaborated principal-agent concept.Desde que Ferrocarriles Alemanes, la mayor empresa estatal de Alemania, se convirti o en una sociedad an onima cotizada en la bolsa en 1994, el gobierno federal ha sido criticado por falta de ambiciones pol ıticas. Desde la perspectiva del principal-agente, el gobierno federal da la impresi on de ser un principal renuente. El primer objetivo es entonces explicar la interacci on estrat egica entre el 210