Das Amt des Bundespräsidenten: einführende Übersicht

Ooyen, Robert Chr. van

doi:10.1007/978-3-658-09925-1_1

Cited by 2 publications

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“…This question is most pertinent to presidents, who, like incumbent governments, often have significant influence on early election calling in parliamentary and semipresidential democracies. To presidents, a parliamentary dissolution that benefits their political allies can have numerous benefits-it may return the presidential party to office, give the president influence on ministerial selection, and open up opportunities to advance policies that reflect presidential preferences (O'Neil, 1993;Millard, 2000;Amorim Neto and Costa Lobo, 2009;van Ooyen, 2015). Judicious influence on assembly dissolution can therefore be expected to aid presidents in building their own and their party's political reputation.…”

Section: The Incumbent's Re-election Chancesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Endogenous and Exogenous Election Timing

Schleiter

2019

The Oxford Handbook of Time and Politics

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This chapter examines the rules that govern election timing in democracies. It begins by distinguishing between constitutionally fixed (exogenous) and constitutionally flexible (endogenous) election timing, reviews which political actors can call early elections when endogenous election timing is permitted, and notes that early elections are heterogeneous and can be of two distinct types—either triggered by government failure or called for partisan advantage. Next, the chapter summarizes the current understanding of the consequences of election timing rules for four important political outcomes: gridlock resolution, the electoral performance of incumbents, the bargaining power of various political actors in negotiating governments and policy, and the rhythm of policy cycles. Together the findings reviewed in this chapter show that election timing rules are highly consequential: they shape election outcomes, accountability, and policy, with significant implications for governance and voter welfare.

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Section: The Incumbent's Re-election Chancesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Endogenous and Exogenous Election Timing

Schleiter

2019

The Oxford Handbook of Time and Politics

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“…A sizable literature shows that European presidents are political actors who use their constitutional powers to pursue policy, office, and electoral goals (Duverger, 1980; Elgie, 1999; Protsyk, 2005; Shugart & Carey, 1992; Strøm & Swindle, 2002; Tavits, 2009). To presidents, a parliamentary dissolution that benefits their political allies can have numerous benefits—it may return the presidential party to office, give the president influence on ministerial selection and open up opportunities to advance policies that reflect presidential preferences (Amorim Neto & Costa Lobo, 2009; Millard, 2000; O’Neil, 1993; van Ooyen, 2015). Thus, presidents who work in coordination with their political allies in government can achieve significant success in implementing their policy goals and building their own political reputation as well as that of their party.…”

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confidence: 99%

Presidents, Assembly Dissolution, and the Electoral Performance of Prime Ministers

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Morgan-Jones

2017

Comparative Political Studies

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Many European presidents have extensive constitutional powers to affect the timing of early parliamentary elections, which enables them to influence when incumbent governments must face the electorate. This paper examines whether presidents use their assembly dissolution powers for partisan benefit. To date, presidential activism in the electoral arena of parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies remains poorly understood. We hypothesize that presidents use their powers to influence election calling for the advantage of their political allies in government. To test this argument, we use data on 190 elections in eighteen European democracies. Our results suggest that presidents with significant dissolution powers are able to shape the electoral success of incumbents. Prime ministers whose governments are allied to such presidents realize a vote and seat share bonus of around five per cent. These findings have implications for our understanding of presidential activism, strategic parliamentary dissolution and electoral accountability.

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Das Amt des Bundespräsidenten: einführende Übersicht

Cited by 2 publications

References 0 publications

Endogenous and Exogenous Election Timing

Endogenous and Exogenous Election Timing

Presidents, Assembly Dissolution, and the Electoral Performance of Prime Ministers

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