Dangerous Liaisons: The U. S. in Guatemala

Setting the agenda for evidence-based research on ending mass atrocities

“…46 Between 1981 and 1983, some 100,000-150,000 Guatemalan Maya were killed by the national armed forces. 47 On 6 August 1983, Montt was overthrown in another military coup. The complaints against him did not include the counter-insurgency, which was deemed successful.…”

“…48 Montt had insisted that 'at least seven more years' 49 were needed in order to consolidate control, whereas the army and its civilian allies 'recognized that a façade of constitutional democracy was needed to overcome the contradictions of direct military dictatorship'. 50 With Montt gone, the counter-insurgency in the Maya rural areas shifted to a three-pronged 'security-qua-development' 51 strategy for institutionalizing EVIDENCE-BASED RESEARCH ON ENDING MASS ATROCITIES control over the Mayan communities: (1) mandatory 'self-patrolling', essentially forcing the community to participate in the suppression of any guerrilla or political activities; (2) the creation of 'model villages' under military control for forcibly displaced populations; and (3) the centralization of development projects under military control, which created a parallel military structure for all civilian authorities. 52 The goal was to transition the Maya to 'consent' to playing a role themselves in the control of their communities.…”

Guatemala, the Peace Accords and education: a post‐conflict struggle for equal opportunities, cultural recognition and participation in education

“…The military coup was a violent response to a moderate land reform that was aimed at redressing highly unequal land distribution. But at the height of the Cold War, the US branded the government as communist and Guatemala as a 'Soviet beachhead' (Jonas 1996). Since then a long series of rightwing military governments have restricted all forms of democratic participation while retaining power through fraudulent elections and internal warfare.…”

“…However, the negotiations proved to be a very arduous process due to strong opposition from the armed 386 M. Poppema forces, the government and the powerful elites. It would take until the end of the Cold War for it to become clear to the conservative forces in society that there would be no further support from their former ally, the USA (Fischer 2001;Jonas 1996Jonas , 2000McCleary 1999).…”

Kapitel IV. Die Arbeitskräftesituation. Zur Lage der deutschen Werktätigen und ausländischen Zwangsarbeiter

“…42 5 Neben solchen Faktoren, die die Arbeitsproduktivität erhöhten und den Grad der Ausbeutung durch größeren Intensitätsgrad der Arbeit in der Regel noch zusätzlich steigerten, war es die allgemeine Verschärfung des Ausbeutungsregimes mit Hilfe des faschistischen Terrors und des Kriegsrechts, die den Folgen des Produktivitätsabfalls entgegenwirkte. Die Stahlwerke Röchling-Buderus AG in Wetzlar stützten sich auf eine Forderung der Rüstungsdienststellen und ließen für die "Aktion 88" (Luftwaffenprogramm) 476 Was die sowjetischen Zwangsarbeiter betraf, so war es behördlicherseits sogar vorgeschrieben, sie nur zu schwerer und schwerster Arbeit zu verwenden. Februar 1942 ausdrücklich gefordert, außer der Rationalisierung jene "weitere Reserve" zu erschließen, die "noch in der Arbeitsleistung des Arbeiters" stecke, der im ersten Weltkrieg mehr geleistet habe.…”