Although frequent in our everyday conversations, irony is a complex pragmatic phenomenon involving specific linguistic, communicative and cognitive abilities in order to be fully understood. In this study we examined the pragmatic comprehension of ironical and non ironical language by analysing event-related potentials (ERPs) of irony decoding process. We asked 12 subjects to listen to 240 sentences with a counterfactual vs. non-counterfactual content and spoken with ironical vs. neutral prosody. ERPs morphological analysis showed a negative deflection peaking in central-frontal and parietal areas at about 460ms post stimulus onset (N400) for all the conditions. Statistical analyses applied to peak amplitudes showed no statistically significant differences between the conditions as a function of the type of sentence (ironical vs. non ironical) and the content of ironical sentences (counterfactual vs. non counterfactual). An increase of N400 related to ironical sentences was nonetheless observed. The absence of an N400 effect may indicate that irony is not treated as a semantic anomaly, although, the observed differences in amplitude could be probably attributed to a higher requirement for the cognitive system in order to integrate contrasting and complex lexical, prosodic and contextual cues. INTRODUCTION: IRONY BETWEEN PRAGMATICS AND PSYCHOLINGUISTICS Although frequent in our everyday conversations, irony remains a complex communicative and pragmatic phenomenon whose correct decoding requires specific linguistic, communicative and cognitive abilities. While trying to explain how irony is used by speakers, linguistics and pragmatics elaborated different theories exploring the nature of ironic communication and of its production and comprehension processes. Within these frameworks, irony has been considered a form of semantic anomaly [1, 2] or as a pragmatic construct involving forms of pragmatic insincerity [3], pretense [4], echoic elements [5] or context-inappropriateness [6]; or again it has been considered as a form of indirect negation [7, 8]. On a cognitive level it has been conceptualized as a form of thought [9-11] involving different grades of contrast between linguistic representation and the reality domain it refers to [12] Finally, with a communicative approach, we can consider irony not as a semantic or pragmatic anomaly, but as a form of communication involving different levels of representation and complex communicative intentions ([13, 14], for analytic review of principal theories on irony). Generally irony can be defined as a pragmatic phenomenon where a gap exists between what is said and what is meant by the speaker. This gap is not necessarily a form of counterfactuality, in fact, Kreuz demonstrated [15] that saying something patently false is only one cue of irony, but not a sufficient one. Some examples of non counterfactual irony are represented by the case of understatements and hyperboles, those particular forms of language where a situation is