Daily-deal market with consumer retention: Price discrimination or quality differentiation

Unlocking the advantages of differential pricing: A two‐period model integrating consumer identifiable information and advertising effort

“…Diverging from discriminatory pricing, Li (2021) studies another discrimination strategy called behavior‐based quality discrimination, revealing that the impact of quality discrimination surpasses that of behavior‐based price discrimination. Tang et al (2021) delve into two strategic marketing models, emphasizing the retention behavior of new consumers and concluded that the seller's optimal strategy shifts from quality differentiation to price discrimination as the profitability of consumer retention increases. Lin and Januardi (2023) delve into quality‐based pricing decisions made by a supplier and a retailer within vertical Nash and Stackelberg games.…”

Supervision Strategy Analysis on Price Discrimination of E-Commerce Company in the Context of Big Data Based on Four-Party Evolutionary Game

“…The target of “big data killing” of e-commerce companies is focused on loyal consumers, which has been confirmed by many scholars. For example, Tang et al [ 24 ] found in the research on the group-buying market that with the improvement of consumer retention rate, the best strategy of sellers is changed from quality difference to price discrimination. Chandra and Lederman [ 25 ] argued that if consumers have differences in potential willingness to pay and brand loyalty, e-commerce companies may increase price differences among some consumers while reducing price differences among the other consumers.…”

“…Chandra and Lederman [ 25 ] argued that if consumers have differences in potential willingness to pay and brand loyalty, e-commerce companies may increase price differences among some consumers while reducing price differences among the other consumers. Although differential pricing is an important way for e-commerce companies to obtain profits [ 26 ], its focus on loyal consumers is contrary to the principle of fair pricing [ 24 ], which will reduce consumer satisfaction and create distrust [ 27 , 28 ].…”

Probabilistic selling and manufacturer encroachment in retail markets with vertical‐differentiated products

“…Such demand deduction is quite common in studies of both marketing and operation management (e.g., Chiang et al, 2003;Zeithammer and Thomadsen, 2013;Tang et al, 2020;Zhang et al, 2021). The profits of the manufacturer and retailer are given by…”

“…Therefore, the demand for product $$h$$ is $$D_h^N = 1 - \frac{{{p_h} - {p_l}}}{{1 - s}}$$, and the demand for product $$l$$ is $$D_l^N = \frac{{{p_h} - {p_l}}}{{1 - s}}\ - \frac{{{p_l}}}{s}$$. Such demand deduction is quite common in studies of both marketing and operation management (e.g., Chiang et al., 2003; Zeithammer and Thomadsen, 2013; Tang et al., 2020; Zhang et al., 2021). The profits of the manufacturer and retailer are given by $$\begin{equation}\pi _m^N = {\rm{\ }}\left( {{w_h} - c} \right)D_h^N + {w_l}D_l^N.\end{equation}$$ $$\begin{equation}\pi _r^N = \left( {{p_h} - {w_h}} \right)\ D_h^N + \left( {{p_l} - {w_l}} \right)D_l^N.\end{equation}$$Proposition In mode N, the optimal wholesale prices of products $$h$$ and $$l$$ are $$w_h^{N{\rm{*}}} = \frac{{1 + c}}{2}$$…”