Cyprus at the Crossroads, 1959–63

Abstract

Cyprus became independent in 1960, after a fierce dispute between Britain, Greece and Turkey; but the island did not find a way towards normal political development. After 1960, the Cyprus Republic, and mainly its President, Archbishop Makarios, could follow either the long-term option of implementing the 1959 Zurich–London agreements and integrating with the West; or the short-term option of trying to acquire unlimited independence and following a non-aligned policy. From late 1962, as disagreements with the Turkish Cypriots grew, Makarios oriented himself to extensive constitutional revision, and finally proposed this unilaterally in late 1963. It was then that the second Cyprus crisis erupted.

The European Union in Northern Cyprus: Conceptualising the Avoidance of Contested States

“…3. For more on the history of the Cyprus problem, see (Castleberry 1964, Joseph 1999, Fisher 2001, Hatzivasileiou 2005. For a more Turkish Cypriot-focused works see Kaymak 2009).…”

When do commitment problems not cause war? Turkey and Cyprus, 1964 versus 1974

“…For the specific needs of my research design, Turkey’s Cyprus policy in June 1964 is an appropriate negative case of homeland intervention because commitment problems were at play. From 4 January 1962, when Makarios made the first public reference to the possibility of revising Cyprus’ power-sharing constitution, his ability to credibly commit to moderate and fair policies was gradually eroded in the eyes of the Turkish-Cypriot leadership and the government of Turkey (Hatzivassiliou, 2005). In the two years preceding June 1964, Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot leaders experienced efforts to change the distribution of power to the disadvantage of the Turkish Cypriots and in favor of the Makarios government.…”

“…Yet, Ankara’s involvement, combined with the increasing influence of partitionists in internal Turkish-Cypriot politics, blocked any departure from the demand that municipal councils be kept separate (see Markides, 2001: 71–127). The issue contributed to Makarios’ commitment problems at the time, because any weakening of separate administration on the municipal level was perceived as an unacceptable transfer of power that would strip the Turkish-Cypriots of all their political rights (Hatzivassiliou, 2005: 536; author’s interviews with Acarkan, 2011; and Kotak, 2011). In August 1962, Denktaş made this connection clear when he stated that separate municipalities were “indisputable indications of the rights of the Turks on this island.…”

“…First, in Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot eyes, Makarios’ attempt at redistributing power by increments manifested itself more than two years before June 1964. In January 1962, Makarios referred for the first time publically to a possible revision of the power-sharing constitution (Hatzivassiliou, 2005: 525). In contrast to 1974, when the distribution of power appeared to shift overnight, key events following Makarios’ 1962 speech suggest a step-wise attempt at power redistribution: Makarios’ November 1962 visit to Ankara, where he again raised the issue of constitutional revision (Hatzivassiliou, 2005: 526); Makarios’ November 1963 publication of his maximal demands for weakening Cyprus’ power-sharing arrangements (Markides, 2001); and during the 1963–1964 fighting, Makarios’ appointment of acting ministers to replace the Turkish Cypriots that had left the cabinet (Rusk to the US Embassy in Cyprus, 28 March 1964).…”

“…In January 1962, Makarios referred for the first time publically to a possible revision of the power-sharing constitution (Hatzivassiliou, 2005: 525). In contrast to 1974, when the distribution of power appeared to shift overnight, key events following Makarios’ 1962 speech suggest a step-wise attempt at power redistribution: Makarios’ November 1962 visit to Ankara, where he again raised the issue of constitutional revision (Hatzivassiliou, 2005: 526); Makarios’ November 1963 publication of his maximal demands for weakening Cyprus’ power-sharing arrangements (Markides, 2001); and during the 1963–1964 fighting, Makarios’ appointment of acting ministers to replace the Turkish Cypriots that had left the cabinet (Rusk to the US Embassy in Cyprus, 28 March 1964). The incremental realignment of power in Cyprus was a process in which the Turkish-Cypriot leadership felt their position worsened “with each passing day”, and the government of Turkey observed that it was being “pushed back steadily” (Rusk to the US Embassy in Cyprus, 28 March 1964; Stevenson to the Department of State, 11 June 1964).…”