Cyclical Dumping and US Antidumping Protection: 1980-2001

Crowley, Meredith A.

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1083814

“…Moreover, the coefficient on trading partner's growth is statistically significant when the time fixed effects are replaced by linear or quadratic time trends (see Table 10), which is the standard specification in the literature. In contrast to this paper, Crowley () and Bown and Crowley () find no evidence for systematic retaliation based on trade defense investigation measures for the financial crisis period.…”

contrasting

confidence: 96%

“…As a first alternative to the time fixed effects in our baseline specification we consider a linear time trend. This alternative specification has the advantage to render our results comparable with the existing literature (Crowley, ; Bown and Crowley, ). The results in column (1) in Table are consistent with our baseline results.…”

Section: Robustnesssupporting

confidence: 76%

Growth, Real Exchange Rates and Trade Protectionism since the Financial Crisis

Georgiadis

¹

,

Gräb

²

2016

Rev International Economics

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Existing evidence suggests that protectionist activity since the financial crisis has been muted, raising the question whether the historically well-documented relationship between growth, real exchange rates and trade protectionism has broken down. This paper re-visits this relationship for the time period since 2009. To this end, we use a novel and comprehensive dataset which considers a wide range of trade policies stretching beyond the traditionally considered tariff and trade defence measures. We find that the specter of protectionism has not been banished: Countries continue to pursue more trade-restrictive policies when they experience recessions and/or when their competitiveness deteriorates through an appreciation of the real exchange rate; and this finding holds for a wide array of contemporary trade policies, including "murky" measures. We also find differences in the recourse to trade protectionism across countries: trade policies of G20 advanced economies respond more strongly to changes in domestic growth and real exchange rates than those of G20 emerging market economies. Moreover, G20 economies' trade policies vis-à-vis other G20 economies are less responsive to changes in real exchange rates than those pursued vis-à-vis non-G20 economies. Our results suggest that-especially in light of the sluggish recovery-the global economy continues to be exposed to the risk of a creeping return of trade protectionism. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor mayKeywords: Trade protectionism, growth, exchanges rates. JEL-Classification: F13, F14.1 Non-technical summaryThe sharp global economic downturn in 2008/09 has nurtured fears that governments might resort to trade protectionism in order to support their economies by sheltering them from foreign competition. As the experience of the Great Depression in the 1930s has vividly illustrated, such a policy response is likely to trigger retaliatory action and thereby to deepen the recession significantly. The fear of a protectionist response to the financial crisis is well-founded, in particular given the robust empirical evidence for the time period prior to the financial crisis showing that governments were more likely to erect trade barriers whenever their economies experienced recessions and/or losses in competitiveness through an appreciation of the real exchange rate. Interestingly, despite this historically well-documented relationship between growth, competitiveness and trade protectionism on the one ...

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“…Existing studies on tariff overhang typically use data on the final bound rate (WTO, 2009;Foletti et al, 2011). This is the bound tariff rate to which countries commit to reduce their bound rate 9 See, for example, Finger et al (1982), Crowley (2011), Bown and Crowley (2013 …”

Section: Tariff Bindings and Tariff Changesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Trade Policy Uncertainty and the WTO

Groppo

¹

,

Piermartini

²

2014

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Bagwell and Staiger (1990) to specify our empirical model for the probability of a tariff increase. We then study how WTO tariff commitments affect this probability. We estimate our model using a database of WTO bound tariffs that we built for all WTO Members from 1996 to 2011 at the HS 6-digit level of disaggregation. Our results show that WTO commitments significantly reduce the probability of a tariff increase, even when the bound tariff is above the MFN applied rate. In addition, the WTO reduces trade policy uncertainty through its monitoring function. These results are robust to including political economy explanations of tariff changes and to addressing endogeneity concerns. Terms of use: Documents in

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“…In particular, there may be scope for a negative domestic shock to be used as a basis for filing a petition since it is likely to be associated with both a reduced domestic price (which raises the likelihood of a domestic/foreign price differential) and injury to the domestic industry. Both Knetter and Prusa () and Crowley () find that domestic shocks play an important role in filing behaviour, along with a number of other studies (see also Bown and Crowley , Staiger and Wolak , Finger , Herander and Schwartz , Feinberg and Hirsch , Hansen , Krupp , Lichtenberg and Tan , Furusawa and Prusa , Blonigen and Sabry ).…”

Section: Us Anti‐dumping Institutions and Filing Behaviourmentioning

confidence: 83%

“…However, the level of aggregation seems to be important for this result. Using more detailed 3‐digit ISIC data, Crowley () finds that a negative foreign demand shock is a significant determinant of the probability of a domestic industry filing an AD petition.…”

Section: Us Anti‐dumping Institutions and Filing Behaviourmentioning

confidence: 99%

Import dynamics and demands for protection

Hillberry

¹

,

McCalman

²

2016

Canadian J of Economics

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What kinds of changes in foreign competition lead domestic industries to seek import protection? To address this question, we use detailed monthly US import data to investigate changes in import composition during a 24-month window immediately preceding the filing of a petition for import protection. A decomposition methodology allows a comparison of imports from two groups of countries supplying the same product: those that are named in the petition and those that are not. The same decomposition can be applied to products quite similar to the imports in question, but not subject to a petition. The results suggest that industries typically seek protection when faced with a specific pattern of shocks. First, a persistent positive relative supply shock favours imports from named countries. Second, a negative demand shock hits imports from all sources just prior to domestic industries' petition for protection. The relative supply shock is a broad one; it applies both to named commodities and to the comparison product group. The import demand shock, by contrast, is narrow, hitting only named products. This negative import demand shock appears to be a key event in the run-up to the filing of a petition. This latter shock has been missed by previous studies using more aggregated data.Résumé. Dynamique des importations et demandes de protection. Quelles sortes de changements dans la concurrenceétrangère conduisent des industries domestiquesà demander qu'on les protège des importations? Pour analyser cette question, les auteurs utilisent les données mensuelles détaillées des importations auxÉtats-Unis pour examiner les changements dans la composition des importations au cours des 24 mois précédant le dépôt d'une pétition pour la protection contre l'importation. Une méthodologie de décomposition permet une comparaison avec les importations de deux groupes de pays qui offrent le même produit : ceux qui sont nommés dans la pétition et ceux qui ne le sont pas. Le même processus de décomposition peutêtre appliqué aux produits assez semblables aux importations en question, mais qui ne sont pas sujetsà pétition. Les résultats suggèrent que les industries typiquement demandent protection quand elles sont confrontéesà un pattern We would like to thank Bruce Blonigen, Chad Bown, Robert Feinberg, James Hartigan, John Ries, Georg Schaur, Maurizio Zanardi and anonymous referees for useful comments on earlier drafts. We also thank audiences at the universities of Adelaide, California -Santa Cruz, Melbourne, South Dakota and Tennessee; Deakin and Purdue universities; the US International Trade Commission; the World Bank; the Australasian Trade Workshop; the Ljubljana and Rocky Mountain Empirical Trade conferences; and the Midwest International Economics Group conference. Corresponding author: Russell Hillberry, rhillber@purdue.edu importations des pays nommés; ensuite, un choc négatif de la demande qui frappe les importations de partout pour les produits des industries domestiques juste avant la pétition demandant de la protection. Le ...

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Cyclical Dumping and US Antidumping Protection: 1980-2001

Cited by 13 publications

References 38 publications

Growth, Real Exchange Rates and Trade Protectionism since the Financial Crisis

Growth, Real Exchange Rates and Trade Protectionism since the Financial Crisis

Trade Policy Uncertainty and the WTO

Import dynamics and demands for protection

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