Cyclic coevolution of cooperative behaviors and network structures

Suzuki, Reiji; Kato, Masanori; Arita, Takaya

doi:10.1103/physreve.77.021911

Cited by 33 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…In addition, theoretical studies showed that dynamic changes in network structures can affect the global dynamics of human behaviors (Zimmermann and Eguíluz, 2005;Pacheco et al, 2006;Suzuki et al, 2008), and recent experimental studies with human participants have also shown that cooperative clusters can emerge when participants could modify their network structure of interactions (Fehl et al, 2011;Rand et al, 2011;Wang et al, 2012;Antonioni et al, 2014;Yonenoh and Akiyama, 2014). This is because participants tend to keep cooperative relationships while severing connections with defectors, and thus form cooperative and highly connected clusters in general (Rand et al, 2011).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Online Experimental Framework for Cooperative Relationships With a Real-Time Decision-Making and Rewarding Environment

Suzuki

Ito

Kodera³

et al. 2018

Front. Ecol. Evol.

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This paper investigates interactions between game theoretical strategies and social relationships in real-time decision-making and rewarding environments. We propose an experimental framework based on techniques of web-based multiplayer online games for this purpose. In our framework, multiple human players, represented as particles in a two-dimensional space of social interactions, can modify their positions and game strategies for the prisoner's dilemma in real time, and receive benefit or cost emerging from both game theoretical and social relationships with neighboring players. We report on experiments with human participants in different conditions of the payoff matrix, which reflects game structures, and the speed of each player, which reflects the ability to change her social relationship. We show that cooperative relationships emerge in real human groups regardless of experimental settings, and show their basic behavioral patterns. We further discuss relationships between behavioral characters of participants in the experiments and their psychological characters to see how their personalities can be reflected in their behavior in such a game theoretical framework, and show that a few psychological characters of participants might reflect their behavioral characters at least in part, but there were variations in these relationships between experimental groups.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Online Experimental Framework for Cooperative Relationships With a Real-Time Decision-Making and Rewarding Environment

Suzuki

Ito

Kodera³

et al. 2018

Front. Ecol. Evol.

Self Cite

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“…Several adequate suggestions have been made in the last decade which try to address the conflict of experiment and theory [5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13][14][15][16][17][18][19][20][21]. One of these research directions assumed that more sophisticated strategies should be used, which go beyond the simplest unconditional cooperator and defector behaviors [22,23].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cooperation driven by success-driven group formation

Szolnoki

Chen

2016

Phys. Rev. E

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In the traditional setup of public goods game all players are involved in every available groups and the mutual benefit is shared among competing cooperator and defector strategies. But in real life situations the group formation of players could be more sophisticated because not all players are attractive enough for others to participate in a joint venture. What if only those players can initiate a group formation and establish a game who are successful enough to the neighbors? To elaborate this idea we employ a modified protocol and demonstrate that a carefully chosen threshold to establish joint venture could efficiently improve the cooperation level even if the synergy factor would suggest a full defector state otherwise. The microscopic mechanism which is responsible for this effect is based on the asymmetric consequences of competing strategies: while the success of a cooperator provides a long-time well-being for the neighborhood, the temporary advantage of defection cannot be maintained if the protocol is based on the success of leaders.

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“…Evolutionary game theory is a powerful framework to study the problem of cooperation and many efforts have been considered in the past years to clarify the raised problem [4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12].…”

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confidence: 99%

Individual wealth-based selection supports cooperation in spatial public goods games

Chen

Szolnoki

2016

Sci Rep

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In a social dilemma game group members are allowed to decide if they contribute to the joint venture or not. As a consequence, defectors, who do not invest but only enjoy the mutual benefit, prevail and the system evolves onto the tragedy of the common state. This unfortunate scenario can be avoided if participation is not obligatory but only happens with a given probability. But what if we also consider a player’s individual wealth when to decide about participation? To address this issue we propose a model in which the probabilistic participation in the public goods game is combined with a conditional investment mode that is based on individual wealth: if a player’s wealth exceeds a threshold value then it is qualified and can participate in the joint venture. Otherwise, the participation is forbidden in the investment interactions. We show that if only probabilistic participation is considered, spatially structured populations cannot support cooperation better than well-mixed populations where full defection state can also be avoided for small participation probabilities. By adding the wealth-based criterion of participation, however, structured populations are capable to augment network reciprocity relevantly and allow cooperator strategy to dominate in a broader parameter interval.

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Cyclic coevolution of cooperative behaviors and network structures

Cited by 33 publications

References 18 publications

An Online Experimental Framework for Cooperative Relationships With a Real-Time Decision-Making and Rewarding Environment

An Online Experimental Framework for Cooperative Relationships With a Real-Time Decision-Making and Rewarding Environment

Cooperation driven by success-driven group formation

Individual wealth-based selection supports cooperation in spatial public goods games

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