Abstract:With the roll-out of electric vehicles (EVs), the automobile industry is transitioning away from conventional gasoline-fueled vehicles. As a result, the EV charging demand is continuously growing and to meet this growing demand, various types of electric vehicle charging stations (EVCSs) are being deployed for commercial and residential use. This nexus of EVs, EVCSs, and power grids creates complex cyber-physical interdependencies that can be maliciously exploited to damage each of these components. This paper… Show more
“…However, EVCSs are not cyberattack-resistant as they depend on the wired and wireless communication systems to share information with the smart grid. The study in [16] categorized EVCS vulnerabilities into two broad categories, i.e., internal vulnerability and external vulnerability. Internal vulnerability such as EVCS processor with weak password and hashing algorithm, weak access control, unsigned firmware update, and easy extraction of firmware can lead to attacker to get full control of EVCS.…”
Section: Cybersecurity Challenges In Grid-connected Ev Charging Stationsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Since there is no worldwide standard for communication systems between EVCSs and EVCS server, the open charge point protocol (OCPP) has been adopted by many vendors. However, OCPP is vulnerable to manin-the-middle attack (MIMA) [16]. In addition to this, many smartphone and web-based applications that assist users in finding EVCSs nearby, authenticating EVs at EVCS, and remotely controlling the charging and payment for the charge have been developed.…”
Section: Cybersecurity Challenges In Grid-connected Ev Charging Stationsmentioning
The world is transitioning from the conventional grid to the smart grid at a rapid pace. Innovation always comes with some flaws; such is the case with a smart grid. One of the major challenges in the smart grid is to protect it from potential cyberattacks. There are millions of sensors continuously sending and receiving data packets over the network, so managing such a gigantic network is the biggest challenge. Any cyberattack can damage the key elements, confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the smart grid. The overall smart grid network is comprised of customers accessing the network, communication network of the smart devices and sensors, and the people managing the network (decision makers); all three of these levels are vulnerable to cyberattacks. In this survey, we explore various threats and vulnerabilities that can affect the key elements of cybersecurity in the smart grid network and then present the security measures to avert those threats and vulnerabilities at three different levels. In addition to that, we suggest techniques to minimize the chances of cyberattack at all three levels.
“…However, EVCSs are not cyberattack-resistant as they depend on the wired and wireless communication systems to share information with the smart grid. The study in [16] categorized EVCS vulnerabilities into two broad categories, i.e., internal vulnerability and external vulnerability. Internal vulnerability such as EVCS processor with weak password and hashing algorithm, weak access control, unsigned firmware update, and easy extraction of firmware can lead to attacker to get full control of EVCS.…”
Section: Cybersecurity Challenges In Grid-connected Ev Charging Stationsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Since there is no worldwide standard for communication systems between EVCSs and EVCS server, the open charge point protocol (OCPP) has been adopted by many vendors. However, OCPP is vulnerable to manin-the-middle attack (MIMA) [16]. In addition to this, many smartphone and web-based applications that assist users in finding EVCSs nearby, authenticating EVs at EVCS, and remotely controlling the charging and payment for the charge have been developed.…”
Section: Cybersecurity Challenges In Grid-connected Ev Charging Stationsmentioning
The world is transitioning from the conventional grid to the smart grid at a rapid pace. Innovation always comes with some flaws; such is the case with a smart grid. One of the major challenges in the smart grid is to protect it from potential cyberattacks. There are millions of sensors continuously sending and receiving data packets over the network, so managing such a gigantic network is the biggest challenge. Any cyberattack can damage the key elements, confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the smart grid. The overall smart grid network is comprised of customers accessing the network, communication network of the smart devices and sensors, and the people managing the network (decision makers); all three of these levels are vulnerable to cyberattacks. In this survey, we explore various threats and vulnerabilities that can affect the key elements of cybersecurity in the smart grid network and then present the security measures to avert those threats and vulnerabilities at three different levels. In addition to that, we suggest techniques to minimize the chances of cyberattack at all three levels.
“…Attacks on the instrumentation to create harmful effects were proposed [28]. Effects on the grid from the manipulation of EV batteries were also surveyed in [29], and some of the same security concerns could apply to gridconnected batteries, while others are specific to the vehicle-charger interaction at public charging stations, which does not apply to grid-connected batteries. Even neural networks have been proposed to attack EV state-of-charge [30].…”
The share of renewable and distributed energy resources (DERs), like wind turbines, solar photovoltaics and grid-connected batteries, interconnected to the electric grid is rapidly increasing due to reduced costs, rising efficiency, and regulatory requirements aimed at incentivizing a lower-carbon electricity system. These distributed energy resources differ from traditional generation in many ways including the use of many smaller devices connected primarily (but not exclusively) to the distribution network, rather than few larger devices connected to the transmission network. DERs being installed today often include modern communication hardware like cellular modems and WiFi connectivity and, in addition, the inverters used to connect these resources to the grid are gaining increasingly complex capabilities, like providing voltage and frequency support or supporting microgrids. To perform these new functions safely, communications to the device and more complex controls are required. The distributed nature of DER devices combined with their network connectivity and complex controls interfaces present a larger potential attack surface for adversaries looking to create instability in power systems. To address this area of concern, the steps of a cyberattack on DERs have been studied, including the security of industrial protocols, the misuse of the DER interface, and the physical impacts. These different steps have not previously been tied together in practice and not specifically studied for grid-connected storage devices. In this work, we focus on grid-connected batteries. We explore the potential impacts of a cyberattack on a battery to power system stability, to the battery hardware, and on economics for various stakeholders. We then use real hardware to demonstrate end-to-end attack paths exist when security features are disabled or misconfigured. Our experimental focus is on control interface security and protocol security, with the initial assumption that an adversary has gained access to the network to which the device is connected. We provide real examples of the effectiveness of certain defenses. This work can be used to help utilities and other grid-connected battery owners and operators evaluate the severity of different threats and the effectiveness of defense strategies so they can effectively deploy and protect grid-connected storage devices.
“…The electrification of the transport sector is expected to play a vital role in mitigating the environmental damages caused by the broad usage of fossil fuels, especially in the power-generation and transportation sectors. It has also stimulated increasing attention towards electric vehicles (EVs) [1]. For instance, the U.K.'s Committee on Climate Change stated that all new cars and vans in the U.K. should be EVs by 2035 [2].…”
Sufficient and convenient fast-charging facilities are crucial for the effective integration of electric vehicles. To construct enough fast electric vehicle-charging stations, station owners need to earn a reasonable profit. This paper proposed an optimization framework for profit maximization, which determined the combined planning and operation of the charging station considering the vehicle arrival pattern, intermittent solar photovoltaic generation, and energy storage system management. In a planning horizon, the proposed optimization framework finds an optimal configuration of a grid-connected charging station. Besides, during the operation horizon, it determines an optimal power scheduling in the charging station. We formulated an optimization framework to maximize the expected profit of the station. Four types of costs were considered during the planning period: the investment cost, operational cost, maintenance cost, and penalties. The penalties arose from vehicle customers’ dissatisfaction associated with waiting time in queues and rejection by the station. The simulation results showed the optimal investment configuration and daily power scheduling in the charging station in various environments such as the downtown, highway, and public stations. Furthermore, it was shown that the optimal configuration was different according to the environments. In addition, the effectiveness of solar photovoltaic, energy storage system, and queue management was demonstrated in terms of the optimal solution through a sensitivity analysis.
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