Cybersecurity of Distribution Devices and Systems

Abstract

This is a cyber‐physical security chapter that provides an interdependent overview between the communication infrastructure and distribution networks. An enumeration of devices at each distribution level and attack event plausibility for each device are reviewed. Among all attack vectors enumerated, consumers are motivated to underreport fraud owing to the financial advantage. These are related to integrity and availability of the confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA). Triad where tampered metering information would result in imprecise electricity bills. As the metering information of consumers' Internet protocol (IP)‐based energy devices in a secondary network can be electronically tampered by fraudulent users, the primary metering infrastructure can be leveraged as a more trustworthy means for data validation. The metering infrastructure of a primary distribution network is instrumented with feeder remote terminal units (FRTUs), connecting remote‐controlled switches or reclosers, for the purpose of dispatching and remote control. These devices in primary and secondary networks can be utilized to cross‐validate with the 15‐min IP‐based “smart” meters on the potential billing discrepancy.