Cyber-Threats Information Sharing in Cloud Computing: A Game Theoretic Approach

Abstract

Cybersecurity is among the highest priorities in industries, academia and governments. Cyber-threats information sharing among different organizations has the potential to maximize vulnerabilities discovery at a minimum cost. Cyberthreats information sharing has several advantages. First, it diminishes the chance that an attacker exploits the same vulnerability to launch multiple attacks in different organizations. Second, it reduces the likelihood an attacker can compromise an organization and collect data that will help him launch an attack on other organizations. Cyberspace has numerous interconnections and critical infrastructure owners are dependent on each other's service. This well-known problem of cyber interdependency is aggravated in a public cloud computing platform. The collaborative effort of organizations in developing a countermeasure for a cyber-breach reduces each firm's cost of investment in cyber defense.Despite its multiple advantages, there are costs and risks associated with cyber-threats information sharing. When a firm shares its vulnerabilities with others there is a risk that these vulnerabilities are leaked to the public (or to attackers) resulting in loss of reputation, market share and revenue. Therefore, in this strategic environment the firms committed to share cyberthreats information might not truthfully share information due to their own self-interests. Moreover, some firms acting selfishly may rationally limit their cybersecurity investment and rely on information shared by others to protect themselves. This can result in under investment in cybersecurity if all participants adopt the same strategy. This paper will use game theory to investigate when multiple self-interested firms can invest in vulnerability discovery and share their cyber-threat information. We will apply our algorithm to a public cloud computing platform as one of the fastest growing segments of the cyberspace.

A Game-Theoretic Framework for the Virtual Machines Migration Timing Problem

“…The use of game theory has largely focused on the VM allocation problem in the presence of adversaries [13], [14], [40], [15], [41]. A common assumption in such formulations is that the adversary is known which does not typically hold in practice.…”

“…• Unlike [13], [14], [15], we do not assume the defender has prior knowledge of the exact location of the attacker, thereby allowing for realistic threat and defense models. The defender has to migrate the VMs at the right time(s) to defend against malicious collocating users.…”

Cyber threat intelligence sharing: Survey and research directions

“…This was one of the first frameworks to share information about security vulnerabilities. The research in [30] presented a game theoretic model for CTI sharing in the cloud. The model focused on trade-offs between the security and risks of sharing CTI.…”

“…The 4 previously presented works contributing to CTI collaboration from various perspectives. Where [29], [30], and [31] are applicable to generic CTI collaboration; [32] focuses on specific CTI sharing collaboration pertaining to environmental needs, i.e., country specific.…”

Threat intelligence platform for the energy sector

“…In these settings, sector‐specific views together with experiences and extended case descriptions need to be exchanged to derive complete benefits . Cyberincident IS has the potential for improving vulnerabilities discovery with reduced costs . It facilitates keeping up with the evolving threat landscape, enhances threat awareness, and enables effective incident response .…”