Cyber Security Countermeasures to Combat Cyber Terrorism

MacKinnon, Lachlan; Bacon, Liz; Gan, Diane; Loukas, George; Chadwick, David R.; Frangiskatos, Dimitrios

doi:10.1016/b978-0-12-407191-9.00020-x

Cited by 11 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…Governments may therefore be inclined to respond to cyber threats and conventional terrorist threats with similar policy instruments. Indeed, states and international organizations such as NATO are known to ‘monitor networks, in particular international Internet traffic’ for emerging cyber threats, including cyberterrorism (MacKinnon et al, 2013: 255).…”

Section: Cyberattacks and State Responsesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cyber scares and prophylactic policies: Crossnational evidence on the effect of cyberattacks on public support for surveillance

Arsenault,

Kreps,

Snider

et al. 2024

Journal of Peace Research

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While conventional terrorism has long been associated with enhanced support for surveillance, scholars have not determined whether variation in the type and outcome of terror attacks, including those emanating from cyberspace, influences public support for these policies. Further, existing studies typically examine public opinion in a single country, thereby failing to investigate cross-national trends in support for surveillance. In this article, we outline a theoretical relationship between cyberattacks and support for surveillance measures and then, through survey experiments conducted in the United States, United Kingdom, and Israel, explore whether variation in both the type (conventional or cyberterrorism) and outcome (non-lethal or lethal outcomes) of attacks influences support for a range of surveillance tactics. We find that while participants do not base their support for surveillance on attack type or outcome and do not differentiate between surveillance tactics when formulating their preferences, there are considerable cross-national differences in support. Participants from Israel generally responded more favorably to all forms of surveillance, independent of experimental treatment, with British respondents demonstrating high levels of support for CCTV cameras. American respondents, however, were generally less supportive of surveillance measures across treatments, with the differences being most notable in their relative reluctance to support the use of CCTV cameras. These findings have important implications not only for the sustainability of national policies but also for international collaboration to manage emerging risks.

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Section: Cyberattacks and State Responsesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cyber scares and prophylactic policies: Crossnational evidence on the effect of cyberattacks on public support for surveillance

Arsenault,

Kreps,

Snider

et al. 2024

Journal of Peace Research

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…The potential for cyber threats to impact electricity infrastructure was first uncovered during the 'Aurora experiment' during which a replica power plant's control systems were hacked causing it to self-destruct (Mackinnon et al, 2013). The ability for cyber risks to cause physical damage to CIs was later realized when the Stuxnet computer worm damaged a uranium enrichment facility in Iran in 2009 -2010 (Nicolas et al, 2011).…”

Section: Scenariomentioning

confidence: 99%

What Happens When the Machines Stop? Uncovering the Risk of Digital Fragility as the Achilles’ Heel of the Digital Transformation of Societies

Herwix¹,

Tieman²,

Rivers³

et al. 2023

Preprint

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The digital transformation of societies has been a core concern for the information systems (IS) research community since its emergence. While most of this work has had a positive outlook, recently a stronger focus on the unintended consequences and dark side of digitalization has come to the fore. This paper contributes to this emerging stream of research by zooming in on a heretofore unrecognized question with potentially catastrophic consequences: What happens to our increasingly digitalized societies when a pro-longed blackout causes a large fraction of digital systems and services to stop working for an extended period of time? To answer this motivating question, we conducted two system dynamics-based simulation experiments to tease out how different degrees of digitalization in a society would affect the resilience of the food system in the face of two different, extreme but plausible prolonged blackout scenarios. We find that a high degree of digitalization has a strong significant negative impact on food system resilience in the investigated scenarios. In the discussion of our findings, we conceptualize “the risk of digital fragility” as the underlying driver of the observed results. Moving forward, we suggest seven mitigation strategies for the risk of digital fragility as fruitful avenues for future research.

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“…Si, sous les réserves évoquées précédemment, l'hypothèse d'une attaque de grande ampleur visant à la destruction d'infrastructures critiques (réseaux bancaires, installations industrielles de type Seveso, lignes de transport…) ou à la paralysie effective de systèmes d'armes ou de commandement n'est pas exclue, une expérience comme celle de l'Estonie montre qu'il n'y a pas d'automaticité dans la réussite de l'attaque et dans les effets destructeurs qu'elle s'assigne. Les politiques de prévention et de protection ne sont pas par nature vouées à l'échec (MacKinnon, Bacon, Gan, Loukas, Chadwick, et Frangiskatos, 2013). Ainsi, dans le cas estonien qui est sans doute l'un des plus commentés, les conditions idéales semblent réunies pour favoriser l'attaquant : un pays cible ayant fait le pari de la dématérialisation de ses processus de gestion et dès lors très dépendant du réseau internet pour le bon fonctionnement de son administration et de ses entreprises, un attaquant (supposé) disposant de tous les moyens étatiques d'une grande puissance, un mode d'action simple mais facile à mettre en oeuvre, une capacité d'action dans la durée.…”

Section: Relativiser La Supériorité De L'attaque Sur La Défenseunclassified

La stratégie militaire à l’heure des NTIC et du « Big Data » : quelles hypothèses structurantes ?

Danet¹

2013

R2IE

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Le développement des NTIC et des méthodes d'analyse et de décision capables de traiter de gros volumes de données de terrain donne aux organisations civiles ou militaires l'opportunité de fonder leurs décisions sur une représentation fidèle de leur environnement mais crée une forme de dépendance essentielle à l'égard de ces systèmes d'information et de commandement. Il en résulte que l'analyse et l'exploitation des différentes sources de vulnérabilité dont ils sont affectés crée un nouveau champ de conflictualité qui n'obéit pas nécessairement aux principes stratégiques établis dans d'autres espaces stratégiques, qu'ils soient conventionnels ou nucléaires. Une réflexion doit donc être conduite en vue de définir ces principes stratégiques plus ou moins inédits et l'architecture institutionnelle au sein de laquelle ils devront être mis en oeuvre. Il s'agit ici de réfléchir à trois idées fortes qui structurent le discours majoritaire autour de la cyber-conflictualité. © 2013 Lavoisier SAS. All rights reserved Mots clés : numérisation du champ de bataille, cyber-conflictualité, continuum sécurité défense, asymétrie, attaque et défense. AbstractHow can the military cope with the revolution of «big data»? Recent developments in ICT and Software industry give to civil and military organizations the opportunity to take decisions based on "big data" coming from the "internet of things". Thanks to this new capability, commanders in chief may almost reach the ultimate fantasy of military strategy: overcome the fog of war. But, this opportunity cannot be isolated from an increased dependency toward these information systems. And from there comes a threat or, at least, a vulnerability of modern armed forces. The strategic principles have to be revisited and, perhaps, redesigned. This paper examines three of the mainstream ideas in matter of Cyber warfare.

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Cyber Security Countermeasures to Combat Cyber Terrorism

Cited by 11 publications

References 23 publications

Cyber scares and prophylactic policies: Crossnational evidence on the effect of cyberattacks on public support for surveillance

Cyber scares and prophylactic policies: Crossnational evidence on the effect of cyberattacks on public support for surveillance

What Happens When the Machines Stop? Uncovering the Risk of Digital Fragility as the Achilles’ Heel of the Digital Transformation of Societies

La stratégie militaire à l’heure des NTIC et du « Big Data » : quelles hypothèses structurantes ?

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