Cyber security analysis of the European train control system

López, Igor Filibi; Aguado, Marina

doi:10.1109/mcom.2015.7295471

Cited by 34 publications

(25 citation statements)

References 4 publications

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“…As an example, based on [15], we add the property Cipher Algorithm to the GSM-R stencil (see Figure 1) and extend the rule set accordingly. Based on this in further evaluation of existing models we will receive a warning that there are potential problems with 3DES.…”

Section: Railway Templatementioning

confidence: 99%

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Threat Modeling in the Railway Domain

Schmittner

Tummeltshammer

Hofbauer

et al. 2019

Reliability, Safety, and Security of Railway Systems. Modelling, Analysis, Verification, and Certification

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Connected and intelligent railway technologies like the European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS) introduce new risks in cybersecurity. Threat modeling is a building block in security engineering that identifies potential threats in order to define corresponding mitigation. In this paper, we show how to conduct threat modeling for railway security analysis during a development life cycle based on IEC 62443. We propose a practical and efficient approach to threat modeling, extending existing tool support and demonstrating its applicability and feasibility.

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Section: Railway Templatementioning

confidence: 99%

“…With the transition to information and communication systems, the cyber-attack surface has increased tremendously. Evaluations showed vulnerabilities and weaknesses in European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS) [3,15] and a rail-based honeypot setup showed an active threat landscape [14].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Threat Modeling in the Railway Domain

Schmittner

Tummeltshammer

Hofbauer

et al. 2019

Reliability, Safety, and Security of Railway Systems. Modelling, Analysis, Verification, and Certification

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“…Additionally, [14] pointed out that since the distribution of the KMAC key is made off-line and this requires personnel to manually deliver the keys from the KMC to the ERTMS entities, many operators decide to simplify the process by using the same KMAC for large train fleets, amplifying the risk of having an attack. Therefore, if the attack is performed during the session establishment process and the same key is shared between different parties, the whole system could be compromised: an attacker could take the identity of many trains in other session establishments.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Framework for Vulnerability Detection in European Train Control Railway Communications

Arsuaga

Toledo

López

et al. 2018

Security and Communication Networks

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Railway systems have evolved considerably in the last years with the adoption of new communication technologies. Aiming to achieve a single European railway network, the European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS) emerged in Europe to substitute multiple and noninteroperable national railway communication systems. This system and its security strategies were designed in late 1990s. Recent works have identified vulnerabilities related to integrity, authenticity, availability, and confidentiality. In the context of defining effective countermeasures to mitigate potential vulnerabilities, these vulnerabilities have to be analysed. In this article we introduce a framework that attempts to challenge ERTMS security by evaluating the exploitability of these vulnerabilities.

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“…Trenbideen ingurunean lan handia egin da prebentzio-segurtasuna bermatzeko, honako artikulu hauetan ikus daitekeen moduan: [7,8]. Baina babes-segurtasuna eskakizun berria da, eta hori bermatzeko ikerketan ahaleginak egin badira ere [5,9,11,12], oraindik ere lan handia behar du. Gainera, prebentzio-segurtasuna bermatzeko erabiltzen diren arriskuen probabilitateetan oinarritutako analisiak ez dira baliagarriak babes-segurtasuna bermatzeko, ezin baita jakin erasotzaile batek noiz aurkituko dituen sistemaren ahultasunak.…”

Section: Ertms Sistemaren Segurtasunaunclassified

“…Horien ondorioz, mezuak errepikatzeko aukera sortzen da. Aurrekoez gain, [11] artikuluan EuroRadio protokoloaren bestelako ahultasunak deskribatzen dira, bereziki KMAC kodea off-line banatzearen Irene Arsuaga Oria, Nerea Toledo Gandarias ondorioz sortzen diren ahultasunak. Izan ere, banaketa hori off-line egitearen ondorioz, beharrezkoa da banaketan gizakien esku-hartzea, lehen esandako moduan.…”

Section: Ertms Sistemaren Segurtasun-arazoakunclassified

Egungo trenbideen komunikazio-sistemen erronka: segurtasuna

Oria

Toledo

2018

EKAIA

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Trenbide-sistemak asko aldatu dira azken urteotan komunikazio-teknologia berrien sorkuntzarekin batera. Europan, trenbide-sare bakarra izateko nahiarekin, ERTMS (European Rail Traffic Management System) sistema sortu zen, elkarrekiko bateragarriak ez ziren Europako herrialdeetako kudeaketa-sistema estandar ezberdinak ordezteko. Baina sistema berria sortzearekin batera, segurtasunaren inguruko hainbat erronka berri ere sortu ziren; izan ere, ERTMS aurreko sistema itxi eta ezezagunak protokolo ireki eta teknologia ezagunez ordeztu ziren. Ondorioz, aurrerapausoak eman diren arren, oraindik ere hutsune nabarmenak daude segurtasunaren arloan.

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Cyber security analysis of the European train control system

Cited by 34 publications

References 4 publications

Threat Modeling in the Railway Domain

Threat Modeling in the Railway Domain

A Framework for Vulnerability Detection in European Train Control Railway Communications

Egungo trenbideen komunikazio-sistemen erronka: segurtasuna

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