Cyber Mercenaries

Abstract

Cyber Mercenaries explores the secretive relationships between states and hackers. As cyberspace has emerged as the new frontier for geopolitics, states have become entrepreneurial in their sponsorship, deployment, and exploitation of hackers as proxies to project power. Such modern-day mercenaries and privateers can impose significant harm undermining global security, stability, and human rights. These state-hacker relationships therefore raise important questions about the control, authority, and use of offensive cyber capabilities. While different countries pursue different models for their proxy relationships, they face the common challenge of balancing the benefits of these relationships with their costs and the potential risks of escalation. This book examines case studies in the United States, Iran, Syria, Russia, and China for the purpose of establishing a framework to better understand and manage the impact and risks of cyber proxies on global politics.

The “New” Private Security Industry, the Private Policing of Cyberspace and the Regulatory Questions

“…There are many other data companies offering such services around the world designating individuals and data associated with them as potential fraudsters (see Christl, 2017). Some private entities also have access to cyber-tools as potent as the state's which are used to engage in corporate espionage and other acts of damage against competitors (see Maurer, 2018;Zilber, 2018).…”

From defence to offence: The ethics of private cybersecurity

“…112 The clients of Hacking Team allegedly included Azerbaijan, Bahrain, and Sudanand their products have allegedly been used to target dissidents. 113 For example, a pro-democracy activist in the UAE was allegedly targeted by a remotecontrol system sold by Hacking Team and he was subsequently arrested in the UAE and tortured. 114 Private cybersecurity firms may be able to attempt to stop some abuses by requiring customer service and product updates, especially given the transitory nature of software, although some firms may have no control over their products once they are sold.…”

Private Sector Attribution of Cyber Incidents: Benefits and Risks to the U.S. Government

“…Political attribution is also difficult since political motives are not always clear and can be purposely obscured to create confusion. 14 For example, states regularly use proxy and non-government actors to conduct cyber operations, with these actors being directed, controlled, and monitored by official state authorities to varying degrees (Healey, 2011;Maurer, 2018). The relevant government might be aware of these operations and thus might bear some legal or other responsibility to prevent them, but might also be able to create sufficient distance to muddy a judgment.…”